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Chapter 1
General introduction
The use of transport imposes a wide range of costs on society: congestion, air pollution,
climate change, accident risks and noise, to name a few. Such costs are external as they are
not included in the market price of transport and, therefore, are not borne by the user. The
failure to reflect these costs within decisions about when, where and how to travel, and
even whether to travel or not, gives rise to a range of inefficiencies that affect the transport
system, and have wider repercussions for the environment and the economy. To achieve
efficiency, the standard argument in economics prescribes marginal-cost pricing, which
includes a Pigouvian tax on external costs. However, constraints in pricing instruments
and other market distortions (either within the transport market or in associated markets),
which are the rule rather than the exception in transport markets, create the need to resort
to other pricing rules. Although departing from optimal conditions, these types of rules
can achieve an optimum, the so-called Second-Best Optimum (after Lipsey and Lancaster,
1957).
Throughout this dissertation, the focus lies on analyzing policy instruments to address
road congestion externalities in a second-best world. A rather general economic definition
of road congestion is that, it occurs when the demand for a road approaches its capacity
and the resulting high use density reduces the quality of service which is reflected in
lower speeds and longer travel times. In a first-best world, in which congestion is the sole
distortion and other transport externalities and other associated markets are correctly priced,
an optimal congestion tax achieves an efficient level of road use. Each trip provides benefits
at least as great as its social costs and no trip meeting this condition is suppressed. This
first-best world, of course, does not exist. Policymakers are instead confronted with real
world situations in which other constraints alter the outcomes of the first-best instrument.
2 General introduction
Departures from the first-best conditions can arise for several reasons. In this disserta-
tion, we concentrate on three reasons. First, we consider constraints in the implementation
of the pricing instrument. This occurs, for instance, when congestion pricing can be
implemented but not every single link in the transport network can be priced. Or when
only substitutes to car use (such as public transport) can be priced, because automobile
congestion cannot be priced. In such cases, in order to overcome the inefficiency of leaving
part of the network unpriced, the instrument should be designed in such a way that it
reflects its spillovers, either negative or positive, on the unpriced links (see e.g. Small and
Yan, 2001; Verhoef and Small, 2004).
The second source of distortions considered in this dissertation arises because not
all markets are efficiently priced. We consider specifically two markets that are closely
related to the transport market, namely the labor market and the energy (or eventually
an environmental) market. Imposing prices in the transport market might have a non-
negligible welfare effect on these markets if they do not function efficiently. Labor
markets are distorted by income taxes which impose a deadweight loss on the tax system.1
Therefore, imposing any other tax can aggravate (or reduce) this deadweight loss. The main
reason for this labor market distortion is income redistribution rather than pure government
revenue raising. This means that we need to consider explicitly different income groups
whenever we discuss the reform of transport and labor taxes. The energy market, on the
other hand, is largely associated to market failures linked to economies of scale in supply,
externalities and government intervention failures, just to mention a few. We concentrate,
again, on the fact that energy commodities used in transport come from a market where
prices do not reflect marginal costs.
The third source of distortion considered arises when congestion is generated in com-
bination with other externalities. As mentioned earlier, when congestion is the only
externality, a tax per vehicle km suffices. However, when the vehicle simultaneously
generates other externalities, and if these externalities not only depend on traffic volume,
addressing them becomes more complex. Climate change externalities, for instance, de-
pend on the type of fuel used, whereas local pollution externalities not only depend on fuel
but also on engine characteristics (among other things). In these circumstances, policy
instruments aiming to reduce one externality can either reduce or exacerbate another.
Although co-benefits can be particularly interesting for policy making, the risk of exacer-
1The deadweight loss or excess burden of taxation can be defined as the added cost to taxpayers and
society of raising revenue through taxes that distort economic decisions (Auerbach and Hines, 2002). The
inability of the government to fully observe individuals’ labor ability makes it resort to taxes that are based
on individuals’ labor earnings, although they distort individuals’ working decisions.
3bating another externality imposes an extra challenge in the design of policy instruments
and a joint optimization of all the policies is required. We focus here on the case where
congestion and climate change externalities are produced simultaneously.
Although theoretical literature on second-best issues offers essential insights on the
design of pricing instruments when one of these distortions occurs, sometimes these
insights do not remain valid in more complex cases where various distortions occur
simultaneously. This dissertation pushes the analysis further by explicitly combining
different sources of distortions under particular conditions. The purpose is to gain a better
understanding of the effect of these distortions on the design of second-best instruments,
the way in which they differ from the first-best and the implied welfare effects.
The first and the second type of distortions (i.e. constraints in implementing the pricing
instrument and labor market distortions) are combined in Chapter 2 to analyze congestion
pricing issues and they are combined in a similar formulation in Chapter 3 to analyze
public-transport pricing. The analyses are performed in an extremely simple general-
equilibrium framework that focuses exclusively on the relationship between the transport
externality-generating activity and the supply of labor. We distinguish between highly
and less productive workers that are perfect substitutes in a linear production function, in
which aggregate labor is the only factor. These two chapters share a normative approach
and contribute to understanding the deviations from marginal-cost pricing that result when
departing from first-best conditions.
Chapter 4 combines the second and the third sources of distortions (i.e. energy market
distortions and several externalities to deal with) when the interaction occurs between
the transport and the energy markets. In this case, two partial-equilibrium models are
linked to perform the analysis. This framework is required given the level of detail
needed for the specification of transport technologies. This chapter moves away from the
normative perspective and concentrates on positive analyses (i.e. scenario analyses). The
main contribution resides in developing a modeling framework that allows analyzing the
complex relationship between the transport and the energy markets. This allows to shed
light on the interactions between policies aimed at curbing transport externalities.
In next section, each chapter is briefly introduced and the link between the chapters is
highlighted. A more detailed discussion of the relevant literature and the contribution of
each chapter is provided in chapters themselves.
4 General introduction
Overview of chapters
Chapter 22 studies congestion pricing when only a part of the transport network can be
tolled, labor taxes distort agents’ behavior and the policymaker is concerned with income
redistribution. In a second-best framework in which externality taxes are used in the
presence of distortionary taxation, the environmental tax literature recommends the use of
the externality-tax revenues to reduce existing labor taxes. Parry and Bento (2001), for
instance, show that using revenues from congestion pricing to reduce labor taxes is welfare
enhancing because it reduces congestion at the same time that it increases labor supply.
They also show that spending revenues in a lump-sum compensation is welfare reducing
because although it reduces congestion, it aggravates the deadweight loss of taxation.
These analyses abstract from distributional considerations and focus on efficiency.
However, at the origin of labor taxes there is often a trade-off between efficiency and
redistribution. Therefore, whenever labor taxes are analyzed their redistribution objective
cannot be ignored. In this chapter, we extend Parry and Bento’s framework by introducing
heterogeneity in labor supply and by taking into account the distributional implications of
the recycling scheme (i.e. how toll revenues are spent).
One theoretical contribution of this chapter is the derivation of second-best optimal
tolling rules that balance efficiency and redistribution considerations. The efficiency
consideration corrects the congestion externality on the tolled road taking into account the
distortion on the non-tolled roads. This shows the first source of distortion considered in
the analysis: the inability of the government to tax every link of the transport network. The
equity consideration, on the other hand, takes into account which income group uses the
tolled road and how toll revenues are spent.
A second theoretical extension of this chapter is to show that equity concerns can lead
a government to prefer inefficient toll levels and recycling via poll transfers rather than via
labor tax reductions. This is because low-income groups are insufficiently compensated in
the case of labor-tax reductions. Note that this conclusion emerges from the combination
of distortions that are considered. By pricing only part of the network, the reduction of
congestion benefits those who can pay for the toll. Those who can pay for the toll are also
those who perform better in the labor market and earn high incomes. Therefore, recycling
toll revenues by reducing labor taxes obviously benefits them. Those who cannot pay for
the toll end up using the part of the network that is untolled but highly congested after the
2A previous version of this chapter has been published as Diaz and Proost (2014), Second-best urban
tolling with distributive concerns. Economics of Transportation, 3 (4): 257–269.
5reform. When they are insufficiently compensated (e.g. labor-tax recycling) the effect is
a reduction of their labor supply. These results highlight the importance of assumptions
about congestability of unpriced links. We show that these assumptions determine the
effects of the recycling scheme on labor supply.
Chapter 3 studies public transport pricing when automobile congestion cannot be
priced. Labor taxes distort the labor market but the government relies on this taxation for
revenue raising purposes (in the case of identical commuters) or for redistribution purposes
(when commuters’ earning capacities differ). When abstracting from distortionary taxation,
the unpriced congestion externality calls for subsidizing the substitute for automobile use:
public transport (Glaister and Lewis, 1978). The optimal transit subsidy depends directly
on the degree of underpricing on automobile traffic. When distortionary taxation is taken
into account, the literature cautions about the welfare loss resulting from financing the
subsidy through distortionary taxation, even if part of this loss is compensated by the
positive effect of the subsidy on labor supply (the analogous to the negative effect of the
congestion tax on labor supply).
In transport economics, it has become customary to assume that the positive effect on
labor supply offsets the negative effect from financing the subsidy. This reasoning neglects,
however, that as long as public transport exhibits scale economies in operator and user
costs, a change of the fare requires the re-optimization of the frequency of service (i.e. the
number of vehicles passing a given stop per hour). That is, if reducing the fare increases
public transport demand, it is optimal from the point of view of both the operator and the
user to adapt the frequency to the higher demand. This therefore implies an additional
efficiency loss if service is financed through distortionary taxation.
In this chapter, we extend the framework developed by Parry (1998), for the analysis of
an environmental subsidy, to analyze public transport fares and frequency provision in the
presence of distortionary taxation and unpriced automobile congestion. Note that, whereas
in Chapter 2 the issue at hand was how to recycle transport tax revenues, in this chapter it
is how to finance a transport service.
In terms of externality correction, our results confirm those from the environmental
tax literature in that, second-best considerations imply lower values of the subsidy that
corrects for the unpriced congestion externality. In terms of the provision of the frequency,
we find an interesting and similar effect. Users’ benefits from scale economies should be
lowered, in the definition of the optimal frequency of service, when the provision of service
is financed by distortionary taxation. As raising revenues from distortionary taxes is costly,
6 General introduction
the level of marginal social benefits needed to justify a certain level of service should be
lower. This, of course, implies a lower level of the frequency. The significance of this
finding resides in the establishment of a relationship between public finance constraints
and operational variables of public transport systems. As far as we know, this kind of
relationship has been neglected until now in the transport economics field.
Another significant finding of this chapter is to show that, from a distributional per-
spective, a transit pricing reform funded through labor taxes is more welfare improving
for the less productive workers. Under this scheme, the cost of the subsidization and the
improvement of the frequency is mainly borne by the most productive workers in the
economy, who may also benefit from the reform through reduced road congestion.
Chapter 4 proposes a modeling approach to study the management of both energy-
related (e.g. CO2 emissions) and "pure" transport-related (i.e. congestion) externalities in
the transport sector. As discussed before, the fact that these externalities are of different
nature complicates the design of policy instruments to address them. Energy related exter-
nalities, for instance, depend on the energy commodity (e.g. fuel, electricity) and vehicle
used, whereas congestion externalities depend on traffic volume on a given infrastructure
and period of time. Another important difference between them is that congestion exhibits
feedback effects on consumption (i.e. congestion discourages travel demand), whereas
CO2 emissions do not. An analysis where both externalities are involved is crucial in a
world where the importance of reducing carbon emissions continues to grow.
On the energy side, complex models have been developed to assess technological solu-
tions and policy related issues to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, these models
use very restrictive assumptions about consumer behavior and, of course, congestion exter-
nalities remain outside their scope (see e.g. Daly et al., 2014; Schäfer, 2012). Transport
economics, on the other hand, has focused on the analysis of congestion externalities,
but makes simplistic assumptions on the energy sector. Our research is situated at the
intersection of these two modeling frameworks.
We link a bottom-up TIMES-based3 model with a transport passenger demand model.
The TIMES-based model represents in detail energy production and its consumption in
the transport sector by different vehicle technologies. The passenger demand model, on
the other hand, simulates consumer decisions and volumes of traffic in the network. Both
externalities are generated by a combination of vehicle technology (e.g. clean and dirty)
3TIMES, The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System, is a model generator developed by IEA-ETSAP.
Documentation can be found at http://www.iea-etsap.org/web/Times.asp
7and road infrastructure (e.g. congested and uncongested road), so that they can be produced
individually (e.g. a dirty vehicle on an uncongested road), or simultaneously (e.g. a dirty
vehicle on a congested road). Transport activities are represented as a set of interrelated
markets that can be supplied by different transport modes (e.g. car, bus, rail), and each
mode can be supplied by different types of vehicles and energy commodities. Consumers’
choice is at the mode level.
The proposed modeling framework, which constitutes the main contribution of this
chapter, allows to understand and identify in a detailed way the different margins of
consumer behavior through which energy and transport policy instruments work. The tool
integrates three key determinants of the assessment of policy effects in transport systems:
consumer choice, congestion feedback effects and constraints in the supply of energy.
Taken together, these features extend ongoing efforts to introduce consumer behavior in
transport energy-system models. A second major extension is that, as the tool integrates
consumption feedback effects, it allows the typical TIMES-based analysis to take account
of policy effects on consumption (such as the rebound effect) or on feedback externalities
(such as congestion). To the best of our knowledge this is the first time that such effects
are analyzed in a TIMES-based model. A final extension that is worth noting is that, as the
tool integrates a detailed description of the energy side, it allows to specify constraints in
the supply of energy in the analysis of "pure" transport-related instruments (e.g. congestion
pricing, parking charges), in which energy prices are typically assumed to be fixed.
The model is used to illustrate the effect of two instruments, a congestion charge and
a CO2 tax. Whereas the congestion tax is a first-best instrument to address congestion
externalities, the CO2 tax is a first-best instrument to address CO2 emissions. We show,
on the one hand, that a tax on CO2 emissions can achieve substantial reductions of CO2
emissions without substantially reducing automobile use, as the charge can be avoided by
the use of more fuel efficient technologies. Therefore, congestion externalities cannot be
efficiently addressed through CO2 taxes and only a small reduction of congestion can be
expected as a co-benefit. A congestion charge, on the other hand, induces important modal
shifts and an efficient distribution of the demand over time and infrastructures. However,
only modest reductions of CO2 emissions can be expected as a co-benefit. If this charge is
not differentiated with respect to vehicle technology, its power to reduce CO2 emissions
can be limited. From these results we conclude that, although co-benefits exist, they might
be lower than expected, once realistic assumptions about consumer behavior are taken into
account.
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Chapter 2
Second-best urban tolling with
distributive concerns
Joint work with Stef Proost
2.1 Introduction
Transport economists advocate road pricing as an efficient instrument to regulate the use
of road infrastructures. Imposing a road toll that reflects marginal external congestion
costs makes consumers use the road up to the point where marginal social costs equalize
marginal social benefits. Optimal road pricing therefore ensures that the only trips made
are those that bring the highest benefits to society. This is only true, however, as long as
tolling is analyzed in a first-best framework. Additional conditions, e.g. not being able to
toll all roads in a network, pre-existing distortions on the labor market, or equity concerns
complicate the optimal design of urban congestion tolls.
The related literature is mainly focused on the interaction of road taxes with taxes on
labor income (see: De Borger, 2009; Mayeres and Proost, 1997; Parry and Bento, 2001;
Parry and Oates, 2000; Parry and Small, 2005; Van Dender, 2003). The issue can be
summarized as follows. Road taxes have a positive welfare impact by reducing congestion
externalities. At the same time, however, they have a negative impact since an increase in
commuting costs discourages labor supply. Which effect (externality reduction or reduced
labor supply) prevails has become a central question in transport economics. Parry and
Bento (2001) showed that the welfare impact of a road tax differs according to the use
of the tax revenues. Using road tax revenues to reduce taxes on labor increases social
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welfare because reduced congestion and reduced labor taxes compensate workers for the
congestion toll. Other revenue uses, such as poll transfers, do not compensate the negative
labor supply impact and reduce welfare. On the other hand, Mayeres and Proost (1997,
2001) demonstrated that as long as equity objectives are relevant, obtaining significant
welfare gains from recycling tax revenues requires a careful balance of several options.
They show that imposing a tax on congestion externalities may need a reconfiguration of
all taxes, and that a reduction of labor taxes is not necessarily the best option.1
This chapter contributes to this line of research by analyzing the importance of revenue
allocation when heterogeneous drivers use a congested network. We wonder whether
taking into account differences across road users and redistribution objectives for transport
policy can change the welfare effect implied by the recycling scheme.
Our approach is close to that of Parry and Bento (2001) but we add two dimensions
to their model. First, instead of a choice between a congested road and uncongested
public transit, we model two congested transport options. They can be both roads or
one of them can be public transit. Allowing congestion on the untolled alternative is
particularly interesting because it implies that the toll not only brings efficiency gains in
the transport market but also efficiency losses in the form of increased congestion in the
rest of the network (see e.g. Rouwendal and Verhoef, 2004). Second, Parry and Bento
consider homogeneous consumers without paying attention to income distribution issues.
However, we know that at the origin of labor taxes there is often the income distribution
objective. With this in mind, we model labor-force heterogeneity in the form of differences
in labor productivity between two types (low- and high-income) of workers. Differences
in productivity imply differences in values of time. This in turn determines the sorting of
commuters over the tolled and the untolled route (see e.g. De Palma and Lindsey, 2004;
Small and Yan, 2001). Tolling the faster route will tend to attract the most productive
commuters. Therefore, the tax can be imposed on high-income consumers and can be used
either to redistribute resources to low-income consumers or to obtain additional efficiency
gains by lowering labor taxes for all commuters.
Our analysis shows that the optimal toll differs from the Pigouvian tax. The toll can
be lower or higher than the marginal external cost on the tolled road. The magnitude of
the deviation depends on several aspects: the equity concerns, who uses the tolled road,
who benefits from redistribution and how easily consumers switch to other alternatives. A
numerical exercise provides two significant insights. First, when accounting for hetero-
geneity, tolling off those that are least able to pay for the toll can be welfare improving, on
1Proost and Van Regemorter (1995) apply this idea to a macro-economic disequilibrium framework.
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the condition that the revenue recycling scheme benefits them. Consequently, if income
distribution concerns seek to favor the least productive workers, the policymaker would
prefer to recycle toll revenues through poll transfers. Second, assumptions about the
relationship between the tolling policy and congestion in the rest of the network determine
the effects of the recycling scheme on labor supply. Neglecting congestion on alternative
routes may result in an overestimation of benefits from the tolling policy.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we develop an analytical model
and analyze the problem with homogeneous households. In Section 2.3, we introduce
heterogeneity in labor productivity and define four different equilibria of road use. In
Section 2.4, we analyze the social planner’s problem and derive the optimal tolling rules
for the different equilibria and for two ways of recycling the toll revenues: poll transfers
and labor tax cuts. In section 2.5, we present a numerical illustration. In the last section
we conclude.
2.2 The household’s problem: road choice
We start with a simple model—in the spirit of Parry and Bento (2001)—of a representative
household whose utility function is specified as2
U (X , tL,DU ,DT ) =U(X , tL)+Ψ(DU ,DT ), (2.1)
where U(·) denotes the utility from aggregate consumption (X , whose price is normalized
to one) and leisure time (tL), andΨ(·) denotes the disutility of commuting3 defined over the
number of days (DR,R=U,T ) the household commutes to work by two parallel congested
routes that connect residential areas to workplaces. U(·) and Ψ(·) are quasi-concave in
their arguments and twice continuously differentiable (UX >0, UtL>0 and ΨDR < 0).
A congestion toll, τ , related to distance, d, is applied on one of the two roads (route
T ), while the other (route U) remains untolled. The household faces the following budget
constraint
X +gdU DU +(g+ τ)dT DT ≤ ew(1− τw)(DU +DT )+G. (2.2)
2The separability of the utility function implies that the amount of labor supplied is independent of the
road choice.
3For interpretative purposes, we assume Ψ(·) to represent the disutility of commuting. This formulation
allows to specify differentiated preferences over the roads. Note that, Ψ(·) does not necessarily represent
the disutility of working given that the supply of labor is determined by ∑R DR. Whether the disutility of
commuting equals the disutility of working will depend therefore on the specification of Ψ(·).
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The right-hand side of (2.2) corresponds to total household’s income composed of
work income and a head subsidy, G. Work income in a period is the product of the daily
net wage and the number of days worked in the period, where e is labor productivity per
day, w is the gross daily wage per productivity unit and τw is a tax levied on labor income.
We assume that households are homogeneous in all respects except that they exhibit
different exogenous levels of labor productivity. Thus, for the same level of labor supplied,
high-productivity households get a higher income than low-productivity households.
The left-hand side of (2.2) corresponds to household expenditures on aggregate con-
sumption and commuting. Each day of work requires a commuting round trip that involves
time and monetary costs. When commuting by the untolled road, only fuel costs are
relevant.4 g represents fuel price per kilometer, g = cg(1+ τg), where cg is the resource
fuel cost (which takes into account vehicle fuel efficiency) and τg the fuel tax. Commuting
by the tolled road implies paying for the fuel consumption plus the toll. However, this road
allows faster trips, while the untolled road requires more time and higher fuel consumption
due to a longer distance: dU = βdT with β > 1.
Households also face a time constraint
t¯ = DU +DT + tU dU DU + tT dT DT + tL. (2.3)
The household’s time endowment during a period, t¯, equates the sum of labor supplied,
commuting time and leisure time. tU and tT are two different functions of time per unit
of distance (e.g. the inverse of the speed -h/km) increasing in the number of trips made
(∂ tR/∂DR > 0), but households take them as fixed and independent of their own behavior.
Households choose how many days to work in a period (hours of work per day are fixed5),
and how to commute to work. By choosing the optimal number of workdays (DT and DU )
in a period, households indirectly set total income and total leisure time during the period.
The first-order conditions of maximizing utility (2.1) subject to (2.2) and (2.3) are (see
Appendix 2.B for detailed derivations)
ew(1− τw)−UtLUX = gdU + tU dU
UtL
UX
−ΨDU
UX
, (2.4)
4We consider that costs such as maintenance, insurance, vehicle ownership taxes, etc., are constant, since
they do not vary with the level of congestion.
5This is a typical assumption in the related literature (see e.g. Parry and Bento, 2001; Van Dender, 2003).
However, it can be argued that hours per day can also be chosen. By using a labor supply model that
allows for optimal choice of both daily work hours and number of workdays, Gutierrez-i-Puigarnau and
Van Ommeren (2009) show that commuting costs can increase daily hours worked. However, they find that
the effect on total labor supply is ambiguous.
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ew(1− τw)−UtLUX = (g+ τ)dT + tT dT
UtL
UX
−ΨDT
UX
. (2.5)
These expressions equate the private benefit from an extra day of work (daily net wage
minus the value of daily leisure time foregone by working) with the generalized private
cost of commuting (monetary and time costs). The monetary cost of transport consists of
the fuel consumption charge in the case of commuting by the untolled road (2.4), whereas
it consists of the fuel consumption plus the toll when commuting by the tolled road (2.5).
As a result of considering time as a resource, we get the monetary value of time for
each household (UtL/UX ). This is the ratio between the Lagrange multiplier of the time
constraint and the Lagrange multiplier of the income constraint (see Appendix 2.B). The
value of spending time in transport6 (Value of Transport Time, V T T ) is represented in (2.4)
and (2.5) by the value of time foregone by commuting plus the marginal disutility of
commuting (V T T = tRdR(UtL/UX)−ΨDR/UX ).
Equating (2.4) and (2.5) yields the Wardrop user equilibrium condition7 for the trans-
port network in which the two roads have equal generalized prices8
τ+g+ tT
UtL
UX
− 1
dT
ΨDT
UX
= βg+β tU
UtL
UX
− 1
dT
ΨDU
UX
. (2.6)
Households are indifferent to taking either of the two roads when the toll imposed on
road T equals the extra-cost of commuting by road U . That is, the extra-gasoline and the
extra travel time costs plus the extra disutility of commuting by that road.9
A household’s individual decision depends on its own value of time (UtL / UX ), which
also determines its willingness to pay for a trip. The opportunity cost of time indirectly
depends on labor productivity. As high-productivity households normally get higher wages,
they should exhibit higher values of leisure time, whereas low-productivity households
exhibit lower values, i.e. UhtL/U
h
X > U
ℓ
tL/U
ℓ
X where h and ℓ indicate highly- and less-
productive households, respectively. As low-productivity households have lower budgets,
they should be more sensitive to monetary cost so that, for a sufficiently high toll, they
should prefer taking the untolled road to save money. This allows the reduction of
6For a detailed explanation of travel time valuation, see Small and Verhoef (2007) and Jara-Diaz (2000).
7The Wardrop principle states that, in the user equilibrium for a given origin-destination pair of substitute
roads, all used routes should have equal average cost and there should be no unused routes with lower costs
(Small and Verhoef, 2007, p. 94).
8We assume we can exclude corner solutions where only one of the two roads is used.
9Note that if the marginal disutility of commuting were the same by the two roads ΨDT /UX =ΨDU /UX ,
only the extra-gasoline and extra-time costs would matter τ+g+ tTUtL/UX = β (g+ tUUtL/UX ).
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congestion on the tolled road and benefits high-productivity households as they might
prefer to pay for the toll to save high-valued time.
We finally define the differentiable demand functions for each road D∗U =DU(τg,τw,τ, tU ,
w,e), D∗T =DT (τg,τw,τ, tT ,w,e). Assuming that they exist allows us to get the household’s
indirect utility function υ(τg,τw,τ, tT , tU ,w,e,G) as a function of exogenous parameters
(see Appendix 2.B).
2.3 Use of the congested roads by heterogeneous house-
holds
In the presence of congestion, households take into account their own travel cost but not
the external cost imposed on other users (∂ tR/∂DR > 0). First-best pricing calls for tolling
both roads at their marginal external costs. However, we are interested in analyzing the
second-best configuration where only one of the two roads can be tolled. In this section
we study the user equilibrium. The properties of the user equilibrium will be instrumental
in the derivation of the optimal taxes in the next section.
We assume that the economy is populated by nh highly productive and nℓ less productive
households (such that nh+nℓ = N). Both kinds of households independently choose the
number of trips they make in a period DiR (with i = ℓ,h). As households differ in their
willingness to pay for commuting, differentiating them according to the road used may
be useful. As a start, we assume consumers with higher values of time to take road T and
consumers with lower values of time to take road U .10
Let us assume for a moment that there is no specific preference for a road. That is,
ΨDℓT /U
ℓ
X =ΨDℓU/U
ℓ
X andΨDhT /U
h
X =ΨDhU/U
h
X . From the right-hand side of equations (2.4)
and (2.5) we can compare the generalized cost (per unit of distance) of commuting for
each road per type of household
τ+g+ tT
(
∑niDiT
)UhtL
UhX︸ ︷︷ ︸
chT
≤ β
(
g+ tU
(
∑niDiU
)UhtL
UhX
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
chU
, (2.7)
10As road T attracts those consumers willing to pay more for faster commuting.
2.3 Use of the congested roads by heterogeneous households 15
τ+g+ tT
(
∑niDiT
)UℓtL
UℓX︸ ︷︷ ︸
cℓT
≥ β
(
g+ tU
(
∑niDiU
)UℓtL
UℓX
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
cℓU
. (2.8)
These conditions compare the total generalized cost of commuting by T (left hand-side)
with the cost of commuting by U (right hand-side) for a high-productivity household (2.7)
and for a low-productivity household (2.8). When a household takes the decision to
commute by one of the roads, it already knows the cost of time it will face: total time
required multiplied by its own value of time.11 Time required (per unit of distance) by
each road is an increasing function12 of total traffic volume. UhtL/U
h
X and U
ℓ
tL/U
ℓ
X represent
the value of time for high- and low-productivity households, respectively.
From (2.7) and (2.8) we establish four different equilibria of use of the roads by
the households,13 similar to those established in Small and Yan (2001). Equations (2.7)
and (2.8) are developed for each equilibrium in Appendix 2.C.
2.3.1 Separating equilibrium
In this case high-income households commute only by T (DhU = 0) and low-income
households only by U (DℓT = 0). This requires equations (2.7) and (2.8) to hold both with
inequality (i.e. chT < c
h
U and c
ℓ
T > c
ℓ
U ).
2.3.2 Partially separating equilibrium with the low-income group sep-
arated
In this case high-income households commute by T and U , and low-income households
commute only by U (DℓT = 0). This requires equation (2.7) to hold with equality and (2.8)
with inequality (i.e. chT = c
h
U and c
ℓ
T > c
ℓ
U ).
11It implicitly assumes consumers are informed about current traffic congestion conditions on both roads,
by for example, electronic bulletin boards or services such as traffic forecast, and of course, by their own
experience.
12tR(∑niDiR) in (2.7) and (2.8) denotes the time function for each one of the roads.
13If we had used a continuum of household types, as in Verhoef and Small (2004), every type of household
would probably have used only one route.
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2.3.3 Partially separating equilibrium with the high-income group
separated
In this case high-income households commute by T (DhU = 0), and low-income households
commute by T and U . This requires equation (2.7) to hold with inequality and (2.8) with
equality (i.e. chT < c
h
U and c
ℓ
T = c
ℓ
U ).
2.3.4 Pooling equilibrium
In this case both kinds of households commute by T and U . If both equations hold with
equality, both types of households will be indifferent towards taking either of the two roads.
This can occur at the no-toll equilibrium14 (τ = 0) and for low toll values. This depends
on how large the parameter β is (the larger β the more difficult it is to obtain a pooling
equilibrium) and on the value of time of low-income commuters (the lower value of time
of the low-income group the more difficult it is to obtain a pooling equilibrium).
2.4 The social planner’s problem: optimal pricing
The government raises revenues to finance public goods, F , and a head subsidy, G, using
three tax instruments: fuel taxes (τg), tolls (τ) and labor taxes (τw). We assume equal
labor tax rates for both types of households.15 Labor productivity (ei) is assumed to
be private information and cannot be verified by the government which only has access
to households’ labor earnings defined as ω i = wei. The government maximizes social
welfare16W=∑i niθ iυ i(τg,τ iw,τ, tU , tT ,ω i,G), subject to the following budget constraint
τw∑
i
∑
R
niω iDiR+ τgcg∑
i
∑
R
nidRDiR+ τdT∑
i
niDiT = F +NG. (2.9)
Each household chooses the optimal number of commuting trips (DiR) that maximizes
its individual utility. The budget constraint (2.9) varies as a function of the use of the roads
14As Small and Yan (2001) and De Palma and Lindsey (2004) show, a pooling equilibrium is a typical
result of a no-toll equilibrium.
15This assumption is relaxed in the numerical illustration.
16This is a purely utilitarian social welfare function where increases or decreases in individual utilities
translate into identical changes in social utility. Assumptions on the concavity of the utility function allow
for the differentiation of the social marginal value of one unit of income over individuals. Another way to
introduce aversion to income inequality is to differentiate θ (the social weight given by the government to
each kind of household, ∑i θ i = 1), over income classes.
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by the households. Thus, each equilibrium implies a different budget constraint. In what
follows, we analyze the optimal toll level for the four possible equilibria studied in the
previous section. For each case, toll revenues are returned to the individuals either through
poll transfers or through labor-tax cuts.
2.4.1 Separating equilibrium
In this equilibrium high-income households take only road T and low-income households
take only road U . Although this case might not seem realistic, it is useful as a bench-
mark that allows comparison with the more complex cases. The government’s budget
constraint (2.9) becomes
τw(nhωhDhT +n
ℓωℓDℓU)+ τgcgdT (n
hDhT +βn
ℓDℓU)+ τdT n
hDhT = F +NG. (2.10)
By assumption in the separating equilibrium, the h-group continues to use only the
tolled road but reduces the number of trips made on this road as the toll increases. On the
other hand, the ℓ-group keeps the number of trips on U fixed.17
Toll revenues used to finance head transfers
We derive the optimal congestion tax, τpt (where pt stands for poll transfers), that max-
imizes social welfare when revenues are returned to households as poll transfers. This
yields
τpt =
1
1−φptϑξ
∂ tT
∂DhT
UhtL
UhX
DhT︸ ︷︷ ︸
mecc
− 1−φptϑ
1−φptϑξ ( τgcg+ τw
ωh
dT︸ ︷︷ ︸
other taxes per trip
), (2.11)
where φpt = n
ℓ
N , ϑ =
(
1− UℓX
UhX
θ ℓ
θh
)
and ξ = 1+ 1ετ
DhT
, with ετ
DhT
the elasticity of demand of
high-income households for the tolled road (see Appendix 2.D).
The optimal congestion toll has two main components, the marginal external congestion
cost (mecc) and a correction for the other taxes levied per trip.18 The mecc measures the
increase in time cost to all road users caused by an extra trip per period. In equation (2.11),
it is represented by the product of: the increase in commuting time from an additional trip
17These assumptions are relaxed in the numerical illustration.
18Given the fully separating assumption, this optimal toll does not incorporate the typical second-best
term that corrects for the distortion of leaving one of the roads untolled. This will however appear in the
partially separating equilibria.
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(∂ tT/∂DhT ), the value of time of the commuter (U
h
tL/U
h
X ), and the number of trips made per
period DhT .
The optimal commuting toll also depends on the prevailing fuel (τg) and labor (τw)
taxes. The fuel tax appears because, in our case, this tax is a fixed charge per km (all
vehicles use the same fuel and do not differ in fuel efficiency) which already acts as a
commuting tax.19 The labor tax appears given the complementary relationship assumed
between work-related trips and labor supply.20 All taxes (per kilometer) levied per day
of work, therefore, serve to tackle the externality caused by each day of work, namely
congestion. Thus, roughly speaking, if the sum of the fuel and the labor tax exceeds
the mecc, rather than taxing road T commuters, the government should subsidize them.
Equation (2.11) therefore suggests an optimal combination of the toll, the fuel tax and the
labor tax, rather than a unique optimal toll level.
Each term in (2.11) is multiplied by a factor that depends on the government distribution
concerns (ϑ ). The government distribution concerns depend on the ratio of the marginal
utility of income of both types of consumers (UℓX/U
h
X ), and the relative social weight given
to a unit of utility of a poor individual with respect to a rich individual (θ ℓ/θ h). Normally,
UℓX/U
h
X > 1 as the marginal utility of income declines with the level of income. Similarly,
θ ℓ/θ h > 1 when the decision maker attaches a higher weight to less-productive consumers.
If there was no difference between the groups (UℓX =U
h
X) and the government attached
the same weight to both of them (θ ℓ = θ h), the toll should equal the difference between
the mecc and the sum of the other taxes.21 When this is not the case, however, the revenue
raising effect implied by the price elasticity of the tolled road (ετ
DhT
) plays an important
role. If the weight attached by the government to the poor is higher and the demand for
the tolled road is inelastic (elastic), the toll should be higher (lower) than the difference
between the mecc and the sum of the other taxes.
This suggests that a greater concern for the welfare of the poor leads to the use of the
toll as an instrument to redistribute income when the demand for the tolled road is inelastic
19Note that, under these oversimplified assumptions, the fuel tax can be used as a congestion tax. In reality,
however, vehicles use different kinds of fuels and exhibit different fuel efficiencies. Moreover, fuel taxes are
a better instrument to address the environmental externalities related to fuel use, which are not considered
here. The use of this tax in the model, however, shows the importance of accounting for prevailing transport
taxes in the design of congestion pricing schemes.
20Dependence of the congestion tax on the labor tax, for commuting trips, was also found by Van Dender
(2003) when analyzing congestion pricing for both commuting and leisure trips. In their case, this dependence
holds even when the labor tax is optimized, whereas leisure transport tolls do not depend on the labor tax.
21Therefore (2.11) contains Parry and Bento’s (2001) result (τ = mecc) as a special case: homogeneous
consumers, no redistribution concerns and no other taxes levied per trip.
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(in this equilibrium road T is used only by the rich). However, when demand is elastic the
use of the toll as an instrument to redistribute income is limited, as every euro of additional
toll revenues then has a high efficiency cost.
Toll revenues used to cut labor taxes
Following the same procedure, we obtain the optimal toll, τlt (where lt stands for labor tax
cuts), when the incremental toll revenues are used to cut labor tax rates
τlt =
1
1−φltϑξ
∂ tT
∂DhT
UhtL
UhX
DhT −
1−φltϑ
1−φltϑξ (τgcg+ τw
ωh
dT
), (2.12)
where φlt =
nℓωℓDℓU
nhωhDhT+nℓωℓD
ℓ
U
(see Appendix 2.D). This expression differs from (2.11) in that
φlt takes into account the proportion of labor supplied by low-productivity households.
Redistributing income through the labor tax implies that what drives equity aspects of the
toll level is the proportion of labor supplied by low-productivity consumers (φlt) rather
than their proportion in the economy (φpt). It is the proportion φlt that will determine the
extent to which the poor will benefit from a labor tax cut.
2.4.2 Partially separating equilibrium with the low-income group sep-
arated
In this equilibrium high-income households take road T and road U , and low-income
households take only road U . As the roads are substitutes, we assume that if the toll
increases, high-income consumers reduce the number of trips they make by road T and
increase the number of trips they make by road U . To keep things simple we assume that
low-income users do not change their number of trips by road U as the toll increases.22
Thus, the government’s budget constraint becomes
τw(nhωh(DhT +D
h
U)+n
ℓωℓDℓU)+ τgcgdT (n
h(DhT +βD
h
U)+βn
ℓDℓU)
+ τdT nhDhT = F +NG.
(2.13)
22These assumptions are relaxed in the numerical illustration.
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Toll revenues used to finance head transfers
When the incremental toll revenues are used to finance lump-sum transfers we get (see
Appendix 2.D)
τpt =
1
1−φptϑξ
UhtL
UhX
(
∂ tT
∂DhT
DhT +
∂ tU
∂DhU
DhUβD
h
TU
)
− 1−φptϑ
1−φptϑξ
(
τgcg(1+βDhTU)+ τwω
h
dT
(1+DhTU)
)
.
(2.14)
Because in this case high-income commuters have the possibility to exchange trips
on road T for trips on road U as the toll increases, we get the term DhTU = ∂D
h
U/∂D
h
T <
0, which gives the number of trips added to U per trip removed from T .23 Although
equation (2.14) has the same structure as (2.11), it incorporates the marginal external
congestion cost caused on road U by the fraction of trips moved from T to U . This is a
typical second best result: mitigate the distortion on one market only to the extent that it
does not aggravate the distortion on the other market (Small and Verhoef, 2007, p. 140).
As before, (2.14) implies that the optimal toll should be set as a fraction of the difference
between the mecc and other taxes per trip.
Toll revenues used to cut labor taxes
The optimal toll when the incremental toll revenues are used to cut labor taxes is given by
(see Appendix 2.D)
τlt =
1
1−φltϑξ
UhtL
UhX
(
∂ tT
∂DhT
DhT +
∂ tU
∂DhU
DhUβD
h
TU
)
− 1−φltϑ
1−φltϑξ
(
τgcg(1+βDhTU)+ τwω
h
dT
(1+DhTU)
)
,
(2.15)
with φlt =
nℓωℓDℓU
nhωh(DhT+D
h
U )+n
ℓωℓDℓU
. This equation has the same structure as (2.14) and contains
the externality-correction term. Again, the only difference between (2.14) and (2.15) is φlt ,
which takes into account the proportion of labor supplied by low-productivity households
as in (2.12).
23This trade-off between roads (∂DhU/∂DhT ) affects the mecc and the second part of (2.14) since revenues
collected from other taxes also depend on the road used.
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Equations (2.14) and (2.15) imply therefore a toll level lower than that implied by (2.11)
and (2.12), respectively, as the former includes a mecc reduced by the effect of traffic
diversion.
2.4.3 Partially separating equilibrium with the high-income group
separated
In this equilibrium high-income households take road T , and low-income households take
both roads. As before, we assume that if the toll increases, low-productivity consumers
reduce the number of trips they make by road T and increase the number of trips they
make by road U . In addition, we assume that high-productivity consumers reduce their
number of trips by road T only as a result of the toll increase. However, they do not move
to road U .24 The government’s budget constraint becomes
τw(nhωhDhT +n
ℓωℓ(DℓT +D
ℓ
U))+ τgcgdT (n
hDhT +n
ℓ(DℓT +βD
ℓ
U))
+ τdT (nhDhT +n
ℓDℓT ) = F +NG.
(2.16)
The optimal toll, if revenues are used to make poll transfers, is as follows
τpt =
1
1−φptϑ −ζ
[
EτDhT
UhtL
UhX
∂ tT
∂DhT
DhT +
θ ℓ
θ h
EτDℓT
UℓtL
UhX
(
∂ tT
∂DℓT
DℓT +
∂ tU
∂DℓU
DℓUβD
ℓ
TU
)]
− 1−φptϑ
1−φptϑ −ζ
[
τgcg
(
EτDhT
+EτDℓT
(1+βDℓTU)
)
+ τw
(
EτDhT
ωh
dT
+EτDℓT
ωℓ
dT
(1+DℓTU)
)]
,
(2.17)
where ζ = ∑i n
iDiT+ϑℓD
ℓ
T
∑i niDiT ε
τ
DiT
and Eτ
DiT
=
niDiT ε
τ
DiT
∑i niDiT ε
τ
DiT
(see Appendix 2.D).
Although (2.17) is more complex than previous equations, we can identify the same
structure. The optimal toll should be set as a fraction of the difference between the
externality-correction term and the correction for other taxes per trip. The externality-
correction term here consists of three terms: the mecc imposed on road T by both kinds of
households and the mecc imposed on road U by low-income households.
In this case, the value of time and price elasticity of demand of both types of consumers
appears in the equation as they both take the tolled road. Each term in this expression is
weighted by a factor (Eτ
DiT
) that depends on the price elasticity of each type of household, as
24These assumptions are relaxed in the numerical illustration.
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the response of consumers to toll increases depends on their price elasticity. As indicated
by Small and Verhoef (2007, p. 145), when tolls cannot be differentiated among user
groups, the second-best toll depends on a weighted average (by the price sensitivity of
demand) of the marginal external costs for the different groups.
We limit this section to the case of poll-transfer recycling as labor-tax recycling does
not add additional insights compared to the previous section.
2.4.4 Pooling equilibrium
We mention this case for the sake of completeness, yet it is highly unlikely that this will be
a welfare maximizing equilibrium given that a pooling equilibrium exists for zero or small
tolls only. It is developed in Appendix 2.D.
2.4.5 The optimal tolling rule: summary
When only one road can be tolled we know this allows for efficiency gains as high-value-of-
time commuters prefer the tolled road. When a separating equilibrium exists, toll revenues
can be used to reduce existing labor taxes (maximizing efficiency gains) or to decrease poll
taxes (maximizing equity effects). Equity concerns can push the toll above the marginal
external congestion cost as this allows to redistribute more revenues to the poor part of
the population. When there is only a partial separating equilibrium the rule becomes more
complex as one now also has to pay attention to the diversion of drivers to the non-tolled
congested route. This calls for lower tolls and limits the redistribution potential of the toll.
2.5 Numerical illustration
This section presents the results of a numerical simulation25 of a road network such as
described in Section 2.2. Although this exercise is merely for illustrative purposes, we
calibrate the model with French data in order to be coherent and give a realistic flavor
to the illustration. Data for the labor and transport markets are taken from the National
Institute of Statistics and Economics Studies -INSEE (Fesseau et al. (2009) and Baccani
et al. (2007), respectively). Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 present the parameter values used
to calibrate the model and the simulation results for the base case. Next, Sections 2.5.3
and 2.5.4 examine the effect of changes in some key parameters.
25The algorithm was written in GAMS.
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2.5.1 Calibration
We choose an urban area of 500.000 inhabitants26 where the average distance of a daily
(round) commuting trip is 50 km. The slope of the congestion function is such that the
free-flow speed (60 km/h) is reduced to one-third in peak hours (this implies a highly
congested commuting traffic). Travel time increases linearly with traffic volume. Both
roads exhibit the same congestion functions, but the secondary network (i.e. the untolled
road) is 1.5 times longer than the tolled road.
We define a household’s utility function27 separable in two terms, the utility of con-
sumption/leisure and the disutility of commuting
U (X , tL,DU ,DT ) = (αX X
σ−1
σ +(1−αX)t
σ−1
σ
L )
σ
σ−1 +αC(DU +DT ). (2.1′)
We choose σ = 1.52 to be consistent with values of consumption/leisure elasticity
of the related literature.28 αX is chosen to imply (on average) around 200 days of work
per year. We set αC = −1 and give no particular weight to any of the roads, so that the
marginal disutility of traveling for any of the routes is the same.29
There are two groups of workers that differ only in their labor productivity. The labor
productivity of high-productivity households is around four times that of low-productivity
households.30 There is a higher proportion of low-productivity workers in the economy
(65%). We assume wage tax rates of 22% and 30% for low- and high-productive house-
holds,31 respectively, and 8 hours of work per day. The gasoline tax is 235% of producer
prices (E.C., 2009, p. 11) and the vehicle fuel efficiency is 10 litres per 100 km.32
The constraints of this maximization problem are those described in (2.2) and (2.3).
Thus, each household chooses, with perfect knowledge of the travel conditions on the
network (tR(∑niDiR)), the route and the number of commuting trips. When a toll is
26With a labor force participation of 70% and an unemployment rate of 15%.
27Similar functions are used in Parry and Bento (2001) and Van Dender (2003).
28See Parry and Bento (2001) p. 658 for a discussion of empirical evidence of this parameter.
29This implies that the roads are perfect substitutes from the consumer perspective. This reflects the
consumer taste and has no relation with the characteristics of the roads.
30According to Fesseau et al. (2009) the best-off households have five times as much disposable income
as the most modest. However this is considering total disposable income, without distinguishing between
the source of income. When excluding returns on financial investments and property income, so that labor
income is better accounted for, the difference in productivity decreases.
31This corresponds to the average rate of social contributions in Fesseau et al. (2009).
32This might seem high compared to current European standards of fuel efficiency, but we deal with
congested urban traffic.
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imposed, toll extra-revenues are recycled in one of two ways: poll transfers or labor tax
reductions.
2.5.2 Base-case results
We first concentrate on changes in the transport market. When there is no toll (the no-toll
equilibrium—NTE), 69% of total traffic is concentrated on road T . This makes T highly
congested. The average speed of a trip on this road is around 20 km/h, whereas on U it is
31 km/h. Figure 2.1 depicts the number of trips that the representative household of each
type makes in a period, as a function of the toll (e/V-km), in the case of labor-tax cuts.33
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Figure. 2.1 Trips per household in the base case (labor-tax recycling)
The two types of workers react differently to the toll. At the NTE low- and high-income
consumers commute mainly by road T . Although this road is highly congested, it is shorter
and allows less fuel-consuming trips. When the toll is imposed, low-income consumers
reduce the number of trips on T and go to U . But high-income consumers react differently:
they exchange trips on U by trips on T . As they can pay for the toll, they can take advantage
of the reduction of congestion on T resulting from low-income commuters leaving this
road.34 This is true until the point the toll equals 0.25 e/V-km.
For low toll values (0≤ τ < 0.25) we are in the Pooling Equilibrium where both kinds
of workers commute by both roads. For higher toll values (τ ≥ 0.25) we are in the Partially
Separating Equilibrium with the low-income group separated. In this case, low-income
33Results from poll transfers are very similar in terms of road use.
34The VOT for low- and high-income consumers are 3.89 and 18.43 e/h, respectively.
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consumers are priced off road T ,35 given that the cost of commuting by T exceeds the cost
of commuting by U . High-income consumers, on the other hand, start switching to road U
since paying a higher toll level no longer compensates the gain in time.
Given that road T allows faster and less fuel-consuming trips than the alternative,
imposing a toll helps to reduce congestion on this road. At τ = 0.25 (the level that allows
the separating regime under labor-tax cuts), for instance, the reduction of traffic on T
compared with traffic at the NTE is around 15% (the average speed rises from 20 to 26
km/h). But this reduction comes at the expense of an increase of traffic on U of 35%
compared with the NTE (the average speed falls from 31 to 24 km/h). As a consequence,
the reduction of congestion does not benefit all commuters in the same way. Given that
low-productive workers use only road U at τ = 0.25, their commuting time (per commuter)
at this point increases by 12% whereas the commuting time for highly-productive workers
falls by 14% (compared with the NTE).
Now we turn to the effects on the labor market. Reduced congestion induces a positive
feedback effect, that mitigates the negative impact of the toll, but this holds only for
highly productive workers (left panel Figure 2.2). The impact of the toll on the less
productive workers is negative. Given the large losses on the less productive labor market,
the impact on aggregate labor supply (in days, not in product) ends up negative (right panel
Figure 2.2).
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Figure. 2.2 Labor supply in the base case: per type of household (left) and aggregate (right)
This differs from Parry and Bento (2001). Our results suggest that, when labor-force
heterogeneity and congestion on the untolled alternative are accounted for, using toll
35Specifically, low-income consumers are tolled off road T at τ = 0.23 for poll transfers and τ = 0.25 for
labor-tax cuts.
26 Second-best urban tolling with distributive concerns
revenues to reduce distortionary labor taxes does encourage labor force participation but
only among the most productive workers (those able to pay for the toll). Similar results are
found for poll transfers. This means that, both types of revenue allocation can discourage
labor force participation at the margin. Our results still show, however, that labor supply
would decline more when toll revenues are used to make poll transfers instead of labor tax
cuts.
Welfare effects of both policies are depicted in Figure 2.3 (the vertical axis shows the
change in individual welfare, in monetary terms, compared with welfare at the NTE). There
is a clear difference between the two scenarios of revenue use across the income groups.
Low-income consumers benefit in the case of head transfers. Recycling via labor-tax cuts
is welfare reducing for them. On the other hand, high-income consumers benefit from
both measures but the welfare gains are (slightly) higher when revenues are redistributed
through labor-tax cuts. This is because, given the same percentage-point reduction of the
labor tax for both groups, the resulting head subsidy is lower (higher) than the tax rebate
that a high-income (low-income) household gets. Labor-tax cuts benefit the h-households
given that, besides the gains from reduced congestion, they receive the major share of
the revenues that are to be redistributed through this scheme. The ℓ-households, on the
other hand, are not compensated enough for the increase of congestion they experience.36
This means that benefits and costs of recycling through this scheme are to some extent
distributed in an inequitable way.
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Figure. 2.3 Change in utility for both recycling policies per type of household (base case)
It is worth noting an additional result from Figure 2.3. High-income workers get the
maximum welfare gain at the point where low-income workers are tolled off road T (at
36This could be different if instead of the same percentage-point reduction of the labor tax for both groups,
the government uses differentiated labor-tax reductions to attain a Pareto-improving reform.
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τ = 0.23 for poll transfers and at τ = 0.25 for labor-tax cuts). Surprisingly, low-income
workers also get the highest benefits when they are tolled off (of course, only in the case of
poll transfers). In fact, in this case they do not pay for the toll but get the transfers from the
high-income group. This would imply that product differentiation is beneficial, even for
lower income groups, provided the right allocation of toll revenues is used.
This is consistent with Small and Yan (2001) in the sense that there is a welfare gain
when heterogeneity is accounted for. However, given that we consider labor markets,
revenue allocation and redistribution,37 we find that the efficiency gain and the impact on
both types of users depend on the way toll revenues are spent.
Even if this result contrasts with that of Parry and Bento (2001), it seems to be in line
with Proost and Van Regemorter (1995) who show that the choice of the recycling scheme
depends on preexisting conditions in the labor market.38
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Figure. 2.4 Welfare gains per household with poll-transfer recycling (left) and total welfare
for both recycling policies (right)
Under the Pareto principle only recycling through poll transfers represents an improve-
ment over the NTE. When acceptability requires the consent of both types of households,
only this tax reform would be approved. Under this recycling regime, any toll level in the
range from 0.15 to 0.28 would make all households better off (left panel Figure 2.4). The
choice of the toll level depends on the government distribution concerns. Toll values close
to the separating-regime level (e.g. 0.23) favor the highly productive workers (without
37Small and Yan (2001) do not deal with the use of the toll revenues nor the effects of redistribution among
users. Their focus is instead on the efficiency of the second-best one-route pricing policy compared with the
first-best result.
38Proost and Van Regemorter (1995) use an AGE-model for Belgium to study the effects of a carbon-energy
tax, by comparing the same two kinds of revenue recycling measures, but analyze a classical unemployment
regime with sticky real wages and a well-functioning economy.
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making the ℓ-group worse off), and toll values closer to the higher limit (e.g. 0.28) favor
the less productive workers (without making the h-group worse off). This implies that
a toll level higher than the one that achieves efficiency in the transport market can be
justified in regard to redistribution and acceptability concerns. Total welfare, obtained
by the unweighted aggregation of utilities, is depicted in the right panel of Figure 2.4.
Welfare effects of labor-tax recycling are negative whereas poll-transfer recycling can be
considered as potential-Pareto welfare improving in the range from 0.1 to 0.35 e/V-km.39
2.5.3 The importance of congestibility of the untolled alternative
We explore here one of the key assumptions of our model: congestion on the untolled
alternative. In this case, this road’s congestion function is replaced by a constant time-per-
unit-of-distance function. This means that, independent of the travel speed, an extra trip
added to this road does not increase the user’s time cost. We call this a non-congestible
alternative. We calibrate the time function to exhibit the same speed as road T at the NTE40
(16 km/h). The rest of the parameters remain unchanged, except for αX that, as in the base
case, is chosen to imply on average 200 days of work per year at the NTE.
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Figure. 2.5 Trips per household with a non-congestible alternative (labor-tax recycling)
Travel patterns change significantly (Figure 2.5), not because the fixed-time cost of U ,
but rather because both roads exhibit a high time cost at the NTE. At this point, consumers
39Note that the potential-Pareto set (Kaldor-Hicks criterion) contains the strict-Pareto subset identified in
the left panel of Figure 2.4.
40Think of this as a road with infinite capacity but whose travel speed is somehow limited to a given level.
We choose road T speed at the NTE as the reference for the sake of coherence.
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only use road T . As the toll increases high-income households increase the use of this road
and the low-income ones switch to road U .
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Figure. 2.6 Labor supply with a non-congestible alternative: per type of household (left)
and aggregate (right)
Not surprisingly, the negative impact on labor supply is reduced now that road U
can accommodate the traffic removed from T without any congestion effect (Figure 2.6).
When toll revenues are recycled through labor-tax cuts, the net impact on aggregate labor
supply is positive (right panel Figure 2.6), as in Parry and Bento (2001). This means
that neglecting congestion on the untolled alternative may result in an overestimation of
the labor-supply gains from labor-tax recycling. On the other hand, if toll revenues are
recycled via poll transfers, the effects on aggregate labor supply are still negative given the
labor supply reduction by the less skilled.
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Figure. 2.7 Change in utility for both recycling policies with a non-congestible alternative:
per type of household (left) and total (right)
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Welfare effects of both policies are similar to those in Figure 2.3. Recycling through
labor-tax cuts remains welfare reducing for the low-income group and welfare improving
for the high-income group. A separating equilibrium is beneficial for both groups. The
main difference with the base-case result is that eliminating congestion on the alternative
road increases the potential welfare gains from each regime.The labor-tax recycling scheme
becomes (potential-Pareto) welfare improving for a large range of toll levels (right panel
Figure 2.7). These results are clearly driven by the assumptions on the substitute for the
tolled road. As highlighted by Basso and Silva (2014), congestion pricing can be welfare
improving for low-income groups if the substitute of the tolled infrastructure—in their
case public transport—is optimized to accommodate the demand that is tolled off.
2.5.4 The relative size of the income groups
We briefly consider the sensitivity of results to the relative size of the income groups. Our
results show that the composition of the economy plays an important role in the efficiency
and welfare effects of the tolling policy.
We vary the size of the groups to imply a share for the low-income group of 5 to 95%.
We find that the higher the proportion of low-income households in the economy, the
higher the reduction of congestion on road T . Clearly, the more commuters that are willing
to leave the tolled road whenever a toll is imposed, the more traffic can be removed from T .
The reduction of travel time ranges from around 4%, when the share of the ℓ-households
is 5%, to around 48%, when the share of the ℓ-households is 95%. A higher share of
the low-income group benefits therefore the high-income group in terms of congestion
reduction.
Interestingly, the pattern of households that benefit from the tolling policy changes
with the variation of these shares (Table 2.1). The tolling policy is beneficial for high-
income commuters whenever the share of the ℓ-group is higher than 45%, regardless of
the recycling scheme. This is because to obtain a significant reduction of congestion, the
group with the lowest value of time should represent more than a certain proportion of the
population. On the other hand, the ℓ-group benefits only when its share is lower than 75%
and toll revenues are recycled via poll transfers. Basically, if the majority of households are
low-income, toll revenues (paid by those who keep using T ) are not enough to compensate
this group for being diverted from T .
Only one Pareto-improving policy was found (Table 2.1). This policy requires two
conditions. First, toll revenues should be recycled via poll transfers (the recycling scheme
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Table 2.1 Pattern of households that benefit from the tolling policy
Policy Share of the ℓ-group Who gains
Poll transfers ℓ < 45% Only ℓ-group gains
Poll transfers 45%≤ ℓ≤ 75% Both groups gain
Poll transfers ℓ > 75% Only h-group gains
Labor-tax cuts ℓ < 45% No gain
Labor-tax cuts ℓ≥ 45% Only h-group gains
that does not harm the ℓ-group). Second, the share for the ℓ-group should be in the range
between 45% and 75%.41 This ensures that the reduction of congestion is attractive enough
for the h-group (ℓ≥ 45%) and that the head transfer is enough to compensate the ℓ-group
for being diverted from T (ℓ≤ 75%).
The variation of the group shares also affects labor supply. This is directly related to
the efficiency of the instrument in terms of reducing congestion. The higher the share of
the low-income group, the more the high-income group will increase its labor supply and
benefit from the pricing of one of the roads.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter considered the introduction of road pricing in an economy with low and high
productivity workers and where only one of two congested links can be tolled. Revenues
can be recycled via poll transfers or labor-tax cuts. We show that the introduction of a
toll recycled via lower labor taxes may benefit only the more productive workers. The
main reason is that the less productive workers, who are tolled off the fast route, end up
on the more congested untolled route and are insufficiently compensated by the labor
tax reduction. For this reason recycling via a head subsidy may make road pricing more
acceptable. Of course, whenever the untolled route is not subjected to congestion, road
pricing becomes a much more efficient instrument and it is much more likely that labor tax
recycling becomes an acceptable instrument.
Our results are relevant for all situations where the transport network cannot be tolled
completely and where there are large differences in worker productivity. In many develop-
ing and developed countries these two conditions are present. The untolled alternative can
be back roads or public transport. Some countries (e.g. France) even require the presence
41These ranges are for the set of parameters of the base case. Of course, changes of some of those
parameters could shift the limits of the ranges, but that should not change the main insight.
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of an untolled alternative for every road that is tolled. We show that this is not a guarantee
for a Pareto-improvement.
This analysis can be extended in several ways. One can consider more complex
networks, consider explicitly two modes rather than two links, introduce other local
externalities along the two roads, consider leisure trips in addition, etc. However, this is
unlikely to change our main insights.
Appendix 2.A Basic notation
Symbol Meaning
R =U,T Index type of road: U untolled road and T tolled road
i = ℓ,h Index type of household: ℓ low-income and h high-income
N Total number of households
ni Number of i-type households
X i Consumption of market goods of i-type households
t iL Leisure time of i-type households
DiR Number of commuting days of i-type households by road R
G Head transfer
F Public goods
U i(X i, t iL) Utility of consumption-leisure of i-type households
Ψi(DiR) Disutility of commuting of i-type households
tR(ni,DiR) Time per unit of distance on road R
τg Fuel tax
τ iw Labor tax for i-type households
τ Toll per unit of distance
g Fuel price
cg Resource fuel cost
dR Distance road R
β Ratio of distance between the roads (β = dU/dT )
ei Labor productivity per day of i-type households
w Gross daily wage per productivity unit
t¯ Households’ time endowment in a period
θ i Social weight attached to i-type households
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Appendix 2.B The household’s problem
The household’s problem defined by (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) can be solved by maximizing
the following Lagrange function
L =U (X , tL)+Ψ(DU ,DT )−λc [X +gdU DU +(g+ τ)dT DT
−ew(1− τw)(DU +DT )−G]+µc [t¯−DU(1+ tUβdT )−DT (1+ tT dT )− tL] ,
where the Lagrange multiplier related to the income constraint (λc) is the marginal utility
of income, and the Lagrange multiplier related to the time constraint (µc) is the resource
value of time. For X > 0, DU > 0, DT > 0 and tL > 0, the system of first-order conditions
can be written as
∂L
∂X
=UX −λc = 0 ⇒ λc =UX
∂L
∂ tL
=UtL −µc = 0 ⇒ µc =UtL
∂L
∂DU
=ΨDU −λc [gβdT − ew(1− τw)]−µc(1+ tUβdT ) = 0
∂L
∂DT
=ΨDT −λc [(g+ τ)dT − ew(1− τw)]−µc(1+ tT dT ) = 0
(2.18)
Using these conditions and both budget constraints, we obtain the demand functions for X∗,
D∗U , D∗T , and t∗L. Replacing these functions in the utility gives the indirect utility function
υ(τg,τw,τ, tT , tU ,w,e,G) which enables rewriting the household’s problem as:
L = υ(τg,τw,τ, tT , tU ,w,e,G)+λc [X +gdU DU +(g+ τ)dT DT
−ew(1− τw)(DU +DT )−G]−µc [t¯−DU(1+ tUβdT )−DT (1+ tT dT )− tL] .
F.O.C.:
∂L
∂τ
= υτ +λcdT DT = 0 ⇒υτ =−UX dT DT
∂L
∂τg
= υτg +λccgdT (βDU +DT ) = 0 ⇒υτg =−UX cgdT (βDU +DT )
∂L
∂τw
= υτw +λcew(DU +DT ) = 0 ⇒υτw =−UX ew(DU +DT )
∂L
∂ tU
= υtU +µcdU DU = 0 ⇒υtU =−UtLdU DU
∂L
∂ tT
= υtT +µcdT DT = 0 ⇒υtT =−UtLdT DT
∂L
∂G
= υG−λc = 0 ⇒υG =UX
(2.19)
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Note that the marginal disutility of the toll increase (υτ ) is the marginal utility of income
(UX ) multiplied by the optimal number of trips (DT ). Similarly, the marginal disutility of
an increase of travel time on road T (υtT ) is the resource value of time (UtL) multiplied by
the optimal number of trips.
Appendix 2.C User equilibrium conditions
In this Appendix we develop Equations (2.7) and (2.8) for each equilibrium. Decision
variables for each condition are denoted by boldface capital letters.
Separating equilibrium
τ+g+ tT
(
nhDhT
)UhtL
UhX
> βg+β tU
(
nℓDℓU
)UhtL
UhX
(2.7.1)
τ+g+ tT
(
nhDhT
)UℓtL
UℓX
> βg+β tU
(
nℓDℓU
)UℓtL
UℓX
(2.8.1)
Partially separating equilibrium with the ℓ-group separated
τ+g+ tT
(
nhDhT
)UhtL
UhX
= βg+β tU
(
nhDhU +n
ℓDℓU
)UhtL
UhX
(2.7.2)
τ+g+ tT
(
nhDhT
)UℓtL
UℓX
> βg+β tU
(
nhDhU +n
ℓDℓU
)UℓtL
UℓX
(2.8.2)
Partially separating equilibrium with the h-group separated
τ+g+ tT
(
nhDhT +n
ℓDℓT
)UhtL
UhX
< βg+β tU
(
nℓDℓU
)UhtL
UhX
(2.7.3)
τ+g+ tT
(
nhDhT +n
ℓDℓT
)UℓtL
UℓX
= βg+β tU
(
nℓDℓU
)UℓtL
UℓX
(2.8.3)
Pooling equilibrium
τ+g+ tT
(
nhDhT +n
ℓDℓT
)UhtL
UhX
= βg+β tU
(
nhDhU +n
ℓDℓU
)UhtL
UhX
(2.7.4)
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τ+g+ tT
(
nhDhT +n
ℓDℓT
)UℓtL
UℓX
= βg+β tU
(
nhDhU +n
ℓDℓU
)UℓtL
UℓX
(2.8.4)
Appendix 2.D The social planner’s problem
Separating equilibrium
By assumption, in this case, DhU = 0 and D
ℓ
T = 0.
Poll transfers
Differentiating the social welfare function with respect to τ , when dτ affects dG, gives
dW
dτ
= θ hnh
(
υhτ +υ
h
tT
∂ tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+υhG
dG
dτ
)
+θ ℓnℓυℓG
dG
dτ
(2.20)
with ∂ tT/∂DhT > 0, dD
h
T/dτ < 0, and dG/dτ > 0. Replacing (2.19) into (2.20) gives
dW
dτ
=−θ hnhdT DhT
(
UhX +U
h
tL
∂ tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
)
+
(
θ hnhUhX +θ
ℓnℓUℓX
) dG
dτ
(2.21)
Differentiating (2.10) with respect to τ gives the change in the transfer (dG) associated to
a change in the toll (dτ)
dG
dτ
=
nhdT
N
[(
τ+ τgcg+ τw
ωh
dT
)
dDhT
dτ
+DhT
]
(2.22)
Inserting (2.22) into (2.21) and dividing by UhX , we have
dW/dτ
UhX
=
(
θ hnh
N
+
θ ℓnℓ
N
UℓX
UhX
)(
τ+ τgcg+ τw
ωh
dT
)
dDhT
dτ
+
(
θ hnh
N
+
θ ℓnℓ
N
UℓX
UhX
−θ h
)
DhT −θ h
UhtL
UhX
DhT
∂ tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
(2.23)
Setting dW/dτ
UhX
= 0, and defining the elasticity of demand of high-income consumers for
the tolled road as ετ
DhT
=
dDhT
dτ
τ
DhT
, we get (2.11).
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Labor-tax cuts
The welfare impact when incremental toll revenues are used to cut the labor-tax is
dW
dτ
= θ hnh
(
υhτ +υ
h
tT
∂ tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+υhτw
dτw
dτ
)
+θ ℓnℓυℓτw
dτw
dτ
(2.24)
with dτwdτ < 0. Replacing (2.19) into (2.24) we have
dW
dτ
=−θ hnhdT DhT
(
UhX +U
h
tL
∂ tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
)
−
(
θ hnhωhDhTU
h
X +θ
ℓnℓωℓDℓUU
ℓ
X
) dτw
dτ
(2.25)
Differentiating (2.10) with respect to τ and solving for dτwdτ gives
dτw
dτ
=
−nhdT
nhωhDhT +nℓωℓDℓU
[(
τ+ τgcg+ τw
ωh
dT
)
dDhT
dτ
+DhT
]
(2.26)
Inserting (2.26) into (2.25), dividing by UhX , setting
dW/dτ
UhX
= 0, and using ετ
DhT
we get (2.12).
Partially separating equilibrium with the ℓ-group separated
Here by assumption DℓT = 0.
Poll transfers
dW
dτ
= θ hnh
(
υhτ +υ
h
tT
∂ tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+υhtU
∂ tU
∂DhU
∂DhU
∂DhT
dDhU
dτ
+υhG
dG
dτ
)
+θ ℓnℓυℓG
dG
dτ
(2.27)
with ∂D
h
U
∂DhT
< 0. Replacing (2.19) into (2.27) gives
dW
dτ
=−θ hnh
(
UhX dT D
h
T +U
h
tLdT D
h
T
∂ tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+UhtLβdT D
h
U
∂ tU
∂DhU
∂DhU
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
−UhX
dG
dτ
)
+θ ℓnℓUℓG
dG
dτ
(2.28)
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Differentiating (2.13) with respect to τ and solving for dGdτ gives
dG
dτ
=
nhdT
N
[(
τ+ τgcg
(
1+β
∂DhU
∂DhT
)
+ τw
ωh
dT
(
1+
∂DhU
∂DhT
))
dDhT
dτ
+DhT
]
(2.29)
Inserting (2.29) into (2.28), dividing by UhX , setting
dW/dτ
UhX
= 0, and using ετ
DhT
we get (2.14).
Labor-tax cuts
dW
dτ
= θ hnh
(
υhτ +υ
h
tT
∂ tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+υhtU
∂ tU
∂DhU
∂DhU
∂DhT
dDhU
dτ
+υhτw
dτw
dτ
)
+θ ℓnℓυℓτw
dτw
dτ
(2.30)
Replacing (2.19) into (2.30) gives
dW
dτ
=−θ hnh
(
UhX dT D
h
T +U
h
tLdT D
h
T
∂ tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+UhtLβdT D
h
U
∂ tU
∂DhU
∂DhU
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
−UhXωh(DhT +DhU)
dτw
dτ
)
−θ ℓnℓUℓXωℓDℓU
dτw
dτ
(2.31)
Differentiating (2.13) with respect to τ and solving for dτwdτ gives
dτw
dτ
=− n
hdT
nhωh(DhT +D
h
U)+nℓωℓDℓU
[(
τ+ τgcg
(
1+β
∂DhU
∂DhT
)
+τw
ωh
dT
(
1+
∂DhU
∂DhT
))
dDhT
dτ
+DhT
] (2.32)
Inserting (2.32) into (2.31), dividing by UhX , setting
dW/dτ
UhX
= 0, and using ετ
DhT
we get (2.15).
Partially separating equilibrium with the h-group separated and rev-
enues recycled via poll transfers
Here by assumption DhU = 0.
dW
dτ
= θ hnh
(
υhτ +υ
h
tT
∂ tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+υhG
dG
dτ
)
+θ ℓnℓ
(
υℓτ +υ
ℓ
tT
∂ tT
∂DℓT
dDℓT
dτ
+υℓtU
∂ tU
∂DℓU
∂DℓU
∂DℓT
dDℓT
dτ
+υℓG
dG
dτ
) (2.33)
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Replacing (2.19) into (2.33) gives
dW
dτ
=− (θ hnhUhX DhT +θ ℓnℓUℓX DℓT )dT
−
(
θ hnhUhtLD
h
T
∂ tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+θ ℓnℓUℓtLD
ℓ
T
∂ tT
∂DℓT
dDℓT
dτ
)
dT
−θ ℓnℓUℓtLβdT DℓU
∂ tU
∂DℓU
∂DℓU
∂DℓT
dDℓT
dτ
+
(
θ hnhUhX +θ
ℓnℓUℓX
) dG
dτ
(2.34)
Differentiating (2.16) with respect to τ and solving for dGdτ gives
dG
dτ
=
dT
N
[
τ
(
nh
dDhT
dτ
+nℓ
dDℓT
dτ
)
+ τgcg
(
nh
dDhT
dτ
+nℓ
(
1+β
∂DℓU
∂DℓT
)
dDℓT
dτ
)
+τw
(
nh
ωh
dT
dDhT
dτ
+nℓ
ωℓ
dT
(
1+
∂DℓU
∂DℓT
)
dDℓT
dτ
)
+nhDhT +n
ℓDℓT
] (2.35)
Inserting (2.35) into (2.34), dividing by UhX , setting
dW/dτ
UhX
= 0, and using ετ
DiT
we get (2.17).
Pooling equilibrium and revenues recycled via poll transfers
In this equilibrium both kinds of households take both roads. Assume that if the toll
increases, both groups reduce the number of trips they make by road T and increase the
number of trips they make by road U . Also assume that road users reduce the number
of trips on T only as a result of the toll increase. These assumptions were relaxed in the
numerical illustration. The government’s budget constraint is
τw(nhωh(DhT +D
h
U)+n
ℓωℓ(DℓT +D
ℓ
U))+ τgcgdT (n
h(DhT +βD
h
U)
+nℓ(DℓT +βD
ℓ
U))+ τdT (n
hDhT +n
ℓDℓT ) = F +NG.
(2.36)
Differentiating the social welfare function with respect to τ , when dτ affects dG, gives
dW
dτ
= θ hnh
(
υhτ +υ
h
tT
∂ tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+υhtU
∂ tU
∂DhU
∂DhU
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+υhG
dG
dτ
)
+ θ ℓnℓ
(
υℓτ +υ
ℓ
tT
∂ tT
∂DℓT
dDℓT
dτ
+υℓtU
∂ tU
∂DℓU
∂DℓU
∂DℓT
dDℓT
dτ
+υℓG
dG
dτ
) (2.37)
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Replacing (2.19) into (2.37) gives
dW
dτ
=− (θ hnhUhX DhT +θ ℓnℓUℓX DℓT )dT
−
(
θ hnhUhtLD
h
T
∂ tT
∂DhT
dDhT
dτ
+θ ℓnℓUℓtLD
ℓ
T
∂ tT
∂DℓT
dDℓT
dτ
)
dT
−
(
θ hnhUhtLD
h
U
∂ tU
∂DhU
∂DhU
∂DhT
dDhT
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+θ ℓnℓUℓtLD
ℓ
U
∂ tU
∂DℓU
∂DℓU
∂DℓT
dDℓT
dτ
)
βdT
+
(
θ hnhUhX +θ
ℓnℓUℓX
) dG
dτ
(2.38)
Differentiating (2.36) with respect to τ and solving for dGdτ gives
dG
dτ
=
dT
N
[
τ
(
nh
dDhT
dτ
+nℓ
dDℓT
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)
+τgcg
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∂DhT
)
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+nℓ
(
1+β
∂DℓU
∂DℓT
)
dDℓT
dτ
)
+τw
(
nh
ωh
dT
(
1+
∂DhU
∂DhT
)
dDhT
dτ
+nℓ
ωℓ
dT
(
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∂DℓU
∂DℓT
)
dDℓT
dτ
)
+nhDhT +n
ℓDℓT
]
(2.39)
Inserting (2.39) into (2.38), dividing by UhX , setting
dW/dτ
UhX
= 0, and using ετ
DiT
we get
τpt =
1
1−φptϑ −ζ
[
EτDhT
UhtL
UhX
(
∂ tT
∂DhT
DhT +
∂ tU
∂DhU
DhUβD
h
TU
)
+
θ ℓ
θ h
EτDℓT
UℓtL
UhX
(
∂ tT
∂DℓT
DℓT +
∂ tU
∂DℓU
DℓUβD
ℓ
TU
)]
− 1−φptϑ
1−φptϑ −ζ
[
τgcg
(
EτDhT
(1+βDhTU)+E
τ
DℓT
(1+βDℓTU)
)
+ τw
(
EτDhT
ωh
dT
(1+DhTU)+E
τ
DℓT
ωℓ
dT
(1+DℓTU)
)]
.
(2.40)
This is the more general equation derived in this analysis. Interpretation is as explained in
Section (2.4).
40 References
References
Baccani, B., Semecurbe, F., and Thomas, G. (2007). Les deplacements domicile-travail
amplifies par la periurbanisation. INSEE PREMIERE 1129, INSEE.
Basso, L. J. and Silva, H. E. (2014). Efficiency and substitutability of transit subsidies
and other urban transport policies. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
6(4):1–33.
De Borger, B. (2009). Commuting, congestion tolls and the structure of the labour market:
Optimal congestion pricing in a wage bargaining model. Regional Science and Urban
Economics, 39(4):434 – 448.
De Palma, A. and Lindsey, R. (2004). Congestion pricing with heterogeneous travelers: A
general-equilibrium welfare analysis. Networks and Spatial Economics, 4(2):135–160.
E.C. (2009). Evolution of oil and petroleum product prices and taxation levels during the
year 2008 in the european union. Report, Market Observatory for Energy. European
Commission.
Fesseau, M., Bellamy, V., and Raynaud, E. (2009). Inequality between households in the
national accounts. INSEE PREMIERE 1265A, INSEE.
Gutierrez-i-Puigarnau, E. and Van Ommeren, J. (2009). Labour supply and commuting.
Discussion Paper TI 2009-008/3, Tinbergen Institute.
Jara-Diaz, S. R. (2000). Allocation and valuation of travel time savings. Handbooks in
Transport, 1:303–319.
Mayeres, I. and Proost, S. (1997). Optimal tax and public investment rules for congestion
type of externalities. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 99(2):261–79.
Mayeres, I. and Proost, S. (2001). Can we use transport accounts for pricing policy and
distributional analysis? Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series
ETE0123, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, CES.
Parry, I. W. H. and Bento, A. (2001). Revenue recycling and the welfare effects of road
pricing. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 103(4):645–71.
Parry, I. W. H. and Oates, W. E. (2000). Policy analysis in the presence of distorting taxes.
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 19:603–613.
Parry, I. W. H. and Small, K. A. (2005). Does Britain or the United States have the right
gasoline tax? American Economic Review, 95(4):1276–1289.
Proost, S. and Van Regemorter, D. (1995). The double dividend and the role of inequality
aversion and macroeconomic regimes. International Tax and Public Finance, 2(2):207–
219.
Rouwendal, J. and Verhoef, E. T. (2004). Second-best pricing for imperfect substitutes in
urban networks. Research in Transportation Economics, 9(1):27–60.
References 41
Small, K. A. and Verhoef, E. T. (2007). The economics of urban transportation. Routledge,
New York.
Small, K. A. and Yan, J. (2001). The value of “value pricing” of roads: Second-best pricing
and product differentiation. Journal of Urban Economics, 49(2):310–336.
Van Dender, K. (2003). Transport taxes with multiple trip purposes. Scandinavian Journal
of Economics, 105(2):295–310.
Verhoef, E. T. and Small, K. A. (2004). Product differentiation on roads. Journal of
Transport Economics and Policy, 38(1):127–156.

Chapter 3
Second-best transit pricing, scale
economies and distortionary taxation
3.1 Introduction
Pricing public transport below marginal social costs has been largely advocated as a
desirable instrument to reduce unpriced automobile externalities. It can also be justified by
the fact that public transport displays economies of scale arising not only from decreasing
average operator costs, but also from decreasing average user costs—the so-called Mohring
effect. This effect implies that user costs (namely, waiting and in-vehicle time costs)
decrease with the increase of patronage, if the frequency of service is optimally adapted
to the higher demand. These two arguments, reduction of car related externalities and
economies of scale, ultimately call for subsidizing public transport on grounds of efficiency.
Nevertheless, subsidies can also be justified on the grounds of equity, when public transport
is more intensively used by low-income groups.
The literature on environmental tax design provides two contrasting arguments about
subsidies. On the one hand, as subsidies are typically financed by distortionary taxes,
they produce an efficiency loss by imposing an extra-burden on the tax system. On the
other hand, the resulting lower living costs increase real wages and produce an efficiency
gain by encouraging labor supply. Although there remains some controversy surrounding
this issue, the general conclusion has been that the increase of labor supply offsets most,
though not all, of the efficiency cost of financing the instrument through distortionary taxes
(Parry, 1998).
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Numerous studies in transport pricing recognize that there is a drawback of financing
subsidies through distortionary taxes, but it is often taken for granted that their counter-
acting effect on economic activity more or less offsets the deadweight loss of financing
them, specially if transit is complementary with labor supply.1 In addition, there might be
an efficiency cost associated to the use of distortionary taxes to provide the service, but no
attention has been paid to this kind of effect in the design of public transport systems. Most
of the existing research on transport pricing in the presence of distortionary taxation have
instead concentrated on the analysis of congestion taxes.2 Obviously, a congestion tax is
a particularly interesting instrument from the point of view of public finances. However,
public and political acceptability might be an obstacle to implementation, whereas the
provision of a subsidized public transport system seems to be more acceptable.3
This chapter explores these types of interactions. It focuses on the relationship be-
tween transport policy and public finance when, in the provision of public transport, the
government does not have access to lump-sum instruments. It analyzes welfare effects, the
optimal structure of the fare and the optimal level of service (frequency) in the presence of
unpriced road congestion externalities, increasing returns to scale in the provision of public
transport, and a pre-existing tax on labor income. In order to analyze these issues, we
extend the approach developed in Parry (1998) for the welfare analysis of environmental
subsidies. We derive expressions for the welfare effects of marginal reductions of the
fare followed by optimal adjustments of the frequency. Only peak commuting traffic is
considered, and strict complementarity with labor supply is assumed. We incorporate, in
Parry’s (1998) framework, a two-mode-model structure that is comparable to the two-road
model. Public transport is seen as one of the links on the network, but a link which exhibits
scale economies based on operator and user-supplied inputs. The other alternative is
automobile use on a congested but unpriced road. Modes are imperfect substitutes.
Our results show that the usual practice of correcting the subsidy by the efficiency
cost of using distortionary taxation should be extended to the correction of the optimal
frequency of service. This confirms that whenever distortionary taxes are used to raise
revenues, their efficiency cost should be taken into account, even on operational variables.
This correction implies a reduction of the optimal frequency compared to the first-best
case, and this is optimal from a social point of view. A numerical simulation shows that,
from a distributional point of view, a transit pricing reform funded through higher labor
taxes is more welfare improving for the less productive workers. In this case, the cost
1See, for instance, comments on this issue in Small and Verhoef (2007) p.158.
2See e.g. Calthrop (2001); Mayeres and Proost (2001); Parry and Bento (2001); Van Dender (2003).
3At least, as suggested by the fact that most transit systems in the world are subsidized.
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of the subsidization and the improvement of the frequency is mainly borne by the most
productive workers in the economy, who may also benefit from the reform through reduced
road congestion.
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. In sections 3.2 and 3.3 we
specify the model and derive consumer’s modal choice conditions. In section 3.4 we
derive the marginal welfare effects of reducing public transport fares and increasing the
frequency of the service for two financing sources: lump-sum taxes and labor taxes. In this
section optimal fare and frequency expressions are also derived. In section 3.5 we derive
optimal pricing rules in the case of heterogeneous commuters. In section 3.6 results from
a numerical example are presented. Policy implications are presented in section 3.7 and
some concluding remarks in section 3.8.
3.2 Model specification
We start by setting up the model with N homogeneous commuters who choose between
two alternatives to commute to work, auto and public transport. The representative agent’s
preferences over consumption are defined by utility U (·) as follows:4
U (X , tL,A,B) =U(X , tL)+Ψ(A,B). (3.1)
U(X , tL) is the utility from consumption and leisure, which depends on the quantity
of a general consumption good (X) and leisure time (tL), and Ψ(A,B) is the disutility
from commuting, which depends on the number of days the worker commutes by auto (A)
and public transport (B).5 U(·) and Ψ(·) are quasi-concave in their arguments and twice
continuously differentiable (UX >0, UtL>0 and ΨA < 0, ΨB < 0)
Agents are subject to the budget constraint
X + cAA+ pBB+ τLS = (1− τw)L, (3.2)
4The separability of the utility function implies that the amount of labor supplied is independent of modal
choice.
5For interpretative purposes, we assume Ψ(·) to represent the disutility of commuting. This formulation
allows to specify differentiated preferences over the modes. Note that, Ψ(·) does not necessarily represent
the disutility of working given that the supply of labor is determined by the sum of A and B. Whether the
disutility of commuting equals the disutility of working will depend therefore on the specification of Ψ(·).
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where cA is the monetary cost of a trip by auto,6 pB is the public transport fare, τLS is a
uniform lump-sum tax, τw the labor tax, and L number of days of work in a period. The
price of the consumption good and the wage rate are both normalized to unity. The budget
constraint equates expenditures on consumption, transport and lump-sum taxes with labor
earnings. As each day of work requires a round commuting trip, labor supplied by the
agent equals total number of trips in a period, L = A+B.
The agent’s time constraint is
t¯ = L+ tAA+ tBB+ tL, (3.3)
where t¯ is time endowment in a period and tA and tB commuting time per mode. Equa-
tion (3.3) ensures that the sum of labor supply, travel time and leisure time equals the
time endowment. More time spent commuting reduces the time for leisure and therefore
reduces utility.
Time cost functions for both modes differ. Whereas time costs for auto basically
depend on in-vehicle time costs, those for public transport are generally decomposed into
waiting, access and in-vehicle time costs.
We define the time cost function for auto as
tA = η0+ηAN, (3.4)
where η0 is the free-flow travel time and η the slope of the congestion function (which
reflects the severity of congestion).
The time cost function for public transport is defined as a function of waiting and
in-vehicle time
tB = α
1
f
+β0+β
BN
f
, (3.5)
where f is a variable that represents the average service frequency and, along with pB, is
set by the government to regulate public transport demand.
The first term in equation (3.5) captures the fact that the average waiting time at the
stop decreases with service frequency. α corrects for the value of waiting time relative
to the value commuters attach to their time. It captures the fact that people dislike more
waiting than being in the vehicle (α > 1). 1/ f is the average time that the commuter has
to wait per day of work,7 assuming that vehicles are equally spaced and that users come to
6This cost consists of both fuel and non-fuel expenses and is assumed to be fixed.
7One round commuting trip implies an average waiting time of 0.5/ f twice a day.
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the stop ad random. The rest of the expression defines in-vehicle time. β0 represents the
travel time cycle at normal operating speed and β represents the dwell time (time spent
stopped at locations to allow passengers to board and alight) which increases with the
demand since, the more boarding and alighting the longer the travel time cycle. Vehicle
capacity is fixed. As the model is not spatially disaggregated, access time costs do not play
an essential role in the analysis and can be ignored without affecting the results.
Note that travel time for automobile use depends on congestion whereas it depends on
dwell time for public transport modes. This means that public transport does not add to
congestion on the road through its use8 but when drivers are diverted from public transport
to automobiles, and vice versa for dwell effects. In other words, congestion and dwell
externalities are induced through the reallocation of the demand from one mode to the
other, but not from the interaction of both modes on one shared infrastructure.
Finally, we define total operator costs (C¯) as the product of the frequency of service
and the costs associated with one driving cycle
C¯ = f cctc = f cc
(
β0+β
BN
f
)
= c0 f + cBBN, (3.6)
where c0 = ccβ0 is the capital and operating cost of a vehicle of a fixed capacity, and
cB = ccβ the unit operator cost.
3.3 Consumer modal choice
Agents maximize the utility function given in (3.1) by choosing X , tL, A, and B, subject to
constraints (3.2) and (3.3), and taking tA and tB as given (see Appendix 3.A). The following
first order conditions apply:
(1− τw)−UtLUX = cA+
UtL
UX
tA−ΨAUX , (3.7)
(1− τw)−UtLUX = pB+
UtL
UX
tB−ΨBUX . (3.8)
The agent’s first order conditions equate the marginal benefit of an extra-day of work
(left-hand side) with its marginal cost (right-hand side). The marginal benefit of a day
8Think of this as rail services, such as metro or train, or dedicated bus lanes.
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of work is the daily net wage minus the value of leisure time forgone by working.9 Its
marginal cost is the generalized cost of commuting, which is the sum of the monetary (cA
or pB) and time costs. The time cost is the time forgone by commuting (tA or tB) times the
value of time, plus the marginal disutility of commuting (ΨA/UX ,ΨB/UX <0).
Equating both conditions gives the Wardrop equilibrium condition in which both modes
have equal generalized prices
pB+
UtL
UX
tB−ΨBUX = cA+
UtL
UX
tA−ΨAUX . (3.9)
This condition implies that the agent uses public transport up to the point where the
generalized price of using it equates the generalized price of using the car. Note that if
using public transport implies a higher disutility for the commuter (|ΨB/UX |> |ΨA/UX |)
and a higher time cost (tB > tA), the public transport tariff (pB) should be lower than the
monetary cost of using the car (cA) in order for the agent to use public transport.
3.4 Second-best pricing
This section presents optimal government decisions with homogeneous commuters. A
revenue-neutral policy reform is implemented in which marginal decreases of pB, followed
by an optimal change in f , are financed by increases of either τLS or τw. The government
maximizes social welfare,10 W = Nυ , and chooses the optimal levels of pB and f , subject
to the budget constraint
(pBB+ τwL+ τLS)N = F¯ + c0 f + cBBN. (3.10)
The three terms on the left-hand side of equation (3.10) are government revenues from
public transport fares, labor and lump-sum taxes. The three terms on the right-hand side
are government expenditures: a fixed quantity of public goods (F¯) and public transport
supply (as defined in (3.6)).
We first analyze the welfare effects and the optimal level of the instruments with lump-
sum tax financing (Section 3.4.1) and move next to labor-tax financing (Section 3.4.2).
9The agent’s value of time is the ratio between the Lagrange multiplier of the time constraint and the
Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint (UtL/UX ).
10No redistribution concerns are taken into account as commuters are homogeneous.
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3.4.1 Policy reform financed by lump-sum taxes
We start by analyzing the simplest case where only public transport is used, and move
next to the case where both modes are used. Separating these cases has the advantage of
making the analysis more tractable and keep transparent the contribution of each effect.
Public transport only
In this case labor supply is simply L = B, as only public transport is used. The marginal
welfare effects of the policy changes are obtained by totally differentiating the welfare
function (W ) and the government budget constraint (3.10) with respect to −pB (i.e. an
incremental reduction of the fare) and f (i.e. an incremental increase of the frequency),
and allowing τLS to vary to maintain the budget balance (see Appendix 3.B). This gives
−dW/d pBUX = (cB− pB)
(−)
dB
d pB︸ ︷︷ ︸
dW PCpB
+
UtL
UX
β BNf
(−)
dB
d pB︸ ︷︷ ︸
dW DWpB
−τw
(−)
dB
d pB︸ ︷︷ ︸
dW LpB
, (3.11)
and
dW/d f
UX
=−
(
c0
N +(cB− pB)
(+)
dB
d f
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dW PCf
+
UtL
UX
(
α 1f +β
BN
f
)
B
f︸ ︷︷ ︸
dW TCf
− UtLUX β BNf
(+)
dB
d f︸ ︷︷ ︸
dW DWf
+τw
(+)
dB
d f︸ ︷︷ ︸
dW Lf
. (3.12)
Expression (3.11) decomposes the general-equilibrium welfare change from a revenue-
neutral decrease of the fare. The effects are classified into three types: primary costs,
effects on travel time costs and effects on the labor market. dW PCpB is the efficiency loss
from transport revenues or primary cost as referred to in the related literature (see e.g.
Parry, 1998). It is the wedge between marginal supply costs and the fare (the subsidy)
multiplied by the overall increase of trips. dW DWpB is the welfare loss from increased dwell
time given the increase of demand. It is the marginal cost of dwell time per vehicle (the
value of time times βBN/ f ) multiplied by the overall increase of trips. dW LpB is the welfare
gain given the increase of labor supply from a higher head tax, which translates into
extra-government tax revenues. We call this term the primary labor effect.
Expression (3.12) decomposes the welfare change from the increase of the frequency.
dW PCf is the primary cost which, in this case, is the average cost of increasing the frequency
(c0/N), plus the cost of the subsidy induced by the change of the frequency. dW TCf and
dW DWf are both effects on time costs. dW
TC
f is the welfare gain from the reduction of
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waiting and dwell time costs and dW DWf is a loss from an increase of dwell time costs
arising from increased demand in response to the increase of the frequency. It might be
reasonable, however, to expect dW TCf > dW
DW
f , so that the overall effect is a welfare gain.
Finally, dW Lf is the welfare gain from increased labor supply.
Under the assumption that only public transport is used, equations (3.11) and (3.12)
give a complete picture of the general equilibrium effect of subsidizing public transport
through lump-sum taxes. The welfare costs are the cost of the policy (dW PCpB and dW
PC
f )
and the increase of dwell time per vehicle (dW DWpB and dW
DW
f ), whereas the benefits are
the reduction of waiting and in-vehicle time costs (dW TCf ) and the increase of labor supply
(dW LpB and dW
L
f ).
We solve (3.11) and derive the social optimal fare
pB = (cB− τw)+UtLUX β
BN
f
. (3.13)
The optimal fare is equal to the marginal cost for society of an extra trip. That is, the
marginal supply cost of a trip (cB) minus the tax already paid on it (τw), plus the marginal
dwell time cost an extra passenger imposes on the system11 (i.e. the correcting Pigouvian
tax associated to the increase of travel time from more boarding and alighting, which
constitutes an externality).
This optimal fare prescribes to price public transport at its marginal cost and to correct
for the labor tax that is paid per day of work. This correction only reflects the complemen-
tarity between commuting and labor supply considered in this analysis.12 For instance,
expression (3.13) could also be seen as if the tax paid per day of work (pB+ τw) equals its
cost for society. Note however that, up to now, there is no reason to price public transport
below its marginal cost as we are not considering its effect on road congestion externalities
(this is analyzed in Section 3.4.1).
11This result is consistent with those from partial-equilibrium analyses (i.e. no link with the labor
market). For instance, De Borger and Proost (2015), with a similar formulation, find the optimal fare to be
pB = cB+βB/ f (with the value of time implicitly normalized to unity). Note that if dwell time costs were
also ignored, the optimal fare would simply be pB = cB.
12This type of result is usual when commuting trips are considered as complementary to the labor market.
For instance, in Calthrop (2001) and Van Dender (2003), where differentiated tolls for commuting and leisure
trips are derived, commuting tolls explicitly depend on the labor tax.
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By solving (3.12) and using (3.13), the optimal frequency financed by lump-sum taxes
( fLS) can be derived
fLS =
√
(α+βBN)UtLUX BN
c0
. (3.14)
This result follows the square root principle (Mohring, 1972), and is close to the
modified square root formula proposed by Jansson (1980) for a one-period demand model
with fixed vehicle-size. It is increasing in users’ benefits (total waiting and dwell time costs)
and decreasing in operators’ cost (the cost of supplying an additional vehicle). Ultimately,
this is the square root of the benefit-cost ratio of supplying an additional vehicle: the ratio
of the social return to the social cost of supplying the vehicle.13 Note that the optimal
frequency will increase proportionally to the square root of total demand if the second
term in the parenthesis is negligible relative to the first (i.e. waiting time is much higher
than dwell time). If the contrary happens, the frequency can vary proportionally to the
demand. Note also that this is the optimal frequency under the condition that the optimal
fare in (3.13) is used. As noted by Jara-Díaz and Gschwender (2009), this implies that
imposing a non-optimal fare affects the optimal design of the service.
Public transport and car use with unpriced car externalities
We now derive the welfare effects of incrementally reducing pB and increasing f when
unpriced car externalities are considered (see Appendix 3.B). In this case L = A+B.
Welfare expressions are as follows:
−dW/d pBUX = (cB− pB)
(−)
dB
d pB︸ ︷︷ ︸
dW PCpB
+
UtL
UX
β BNf
(−)
dB
d pB︸ ︷︷ ︸
dW DWpB
+
UtL
UX
ηAN
(+)
dA
d pB︸ ︷︷ ︸
dWCNpB
−τw
( (+)
dA
d pB
+
(−)
dB
d pB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dW LpB
, (3.15)
and
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UX
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c0
N +(cB− pB)
(+)
dB
d f
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dW PCf
+
UtL
UX
(
α 1f +β
BN
f
)
B
f︸ ︷︷ ︸
dW TCf
− UtLUX β BNf
(+)
dB
d f︸ ︷︷ ︸
dW DWf
− UtLUX ηAN
(−)
dA
d f︸ ︷︷ ︸
dWCNf
+τw
( (−)
dA
d f +
(+)
dB
d f
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dW Lf
.
(3.16)
13The social return of increasing the frequency is the reduced waiting and in-vehicle times for public
transport users.
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In addition to the terms already explained in equations (3.11) and (3.12), expres-
sions (3.15) and (3.16) include dWCNpB and dW
CN
f which account for the welfare gain of
reduced road congestion externalities given both, the reduction of the fare and the increase
in the frequency. The marginal external cost of road congestion is the product of the value
of time of the commuter and the congestion effect (ηAN). Note that the labor supply
effects, dW LpB and dW
L
f , are modified to include the complete effect of the reform on labor
supply. In order for this effect to be positive, dB/d pB should be higher than dA/d pB (and
similarly, dB/d f > dA/d f ). The ultimate effect depends, of course, on the price elasticity
of the demand. This is discussed below.
Solving for the optimal fare, we get
pB = (cB− τw (1+ϒ))+UtLUX
β
f
BN+
UtL
UX
ηANϒ, (3.17)
where ϒ = AεPBA /Bε
PB
B , and ε
PB
A and ε
PB
B are the cross- and own-elasticities of public
transport demand with respect to the fare, therefore ϒ< 0.
The ratio ϒ reflects the degree to which a reduction of the public transport fare induces
commuters to switch from automobile use to public transport. This ratio determines the
effectiveness of the subsidy to reduce road congestion externalities and therefore multiplies
the Pigouvian component related to road congestion. It also multiplies the tax rate on labor
as, at the same time, it determines the extent to which revenues from labor taxes vary.
Note that if ϒ = −1, the fare in (3.17) would exactly equal the marginal cost of a
passenger in public transport minus the marginal external cost of a passenger on the road.
However, taking into account estimates of fare elasticities, this is unlikely to hold.14 Since
the direct price elasticity may be higher, in absolute value, than the cross-elasticity for
automobile trips (|εPBB |> |εPBA |), we might have −1< εPBA /εPBB < 0, and ϒ might be in the
interval −1< ϒ< 0 for a large range of values of A/B (the ratio of automobile to public
transport use). The case of ϒ≤−1 would only be possible when A/B≫ 1. The intuition
behind this case is that when the base of automobile use is large, a lower public transport
fare might have a higher effect in reducing road congestion and this is translated into a
higher magnitude of the last term in (3.17).
In any case, since ϒ < 0, the optimal fare in (3.17) calls for pricing public transport
below its marginal cost. The marginal cost of a trip in public transport should be reduced
14There might not be a one-to-one relationship between the number of trips removed from the road and
added to public transport. This can only happen if the ratio A/B exactly offsets the ratio εPBA /ε
PB
B , which is
unlikely to hold.
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by the benefit of reduced congestion per rider diverted from car to public transport. This is
in agreement with results obtained by Glaister and Lewis (1978).
The optimal frequency is the same as in (3.14), if the optimal fare in (3.17) is applied
and under the assumption that the ratio ε fA/ε
f
B equals the ratio ε
pB
A /ε
pB
B , where ε
f
A and ε
f
B
are the cross- and own-headway elasticities. This assumption implies that, at the aggregate
level (when accounting for the effect on both car and public transport use), an increase of
the frequency has the same effect as a decrease of the fare. This assumption seems plausible
as user generalized costs depend on time and money costs and might be influenced more
or less in the same way by an increase in frequency as by a decrease in price.
3.4.2 Policy reform financed by labor taxes
We turn now to the case where labor taxes are used to finance the reform. Considering labor
tax financing with homogeneous commuters is of little ultimate interest if the government
can use a uniform lump-sum tax. The underlying assumption for this analysis is therefore
that the government does not have access to this type of instrument. Again, we start by
analyzing the simplest case where only public transport is used.
Public transport only
In this case, the welfare function and the government budget constraint (3.10) are differen-
tiated with respect to −pB and f , allowing τw to vary to maintain the budget balance (see
Appendix 3.C). The following welfare change expressions apply:
−dW/d pBUX =(cB− pB)
(−)
dB
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dW PCpB
−m
(
B− (cB− pB)
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dB
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dB
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dB
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(3.18)
and
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dB
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UX
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B
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dB
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,
(3.19)
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where
m =
−τw
(−)
dL
dτw
L+ τw dLdτw
, (3.20)
with L = B, as only public transport is used.
Before explaining the welfare effects implied by (3.18) and (3.19), we concentrate on
expression (3.20) which provides an useful concept to interpret the welfare effects now
that the labor tax is used to finance the reform. This expression defines the efficiency cost
of raising an additional euro of revenue from labor taxes. This is usually referred to as the
marginal welfare cost of taxation (see e.g. Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002; Bovenberg and
van der Ploeg, 1994; Parry, 1998). It is the ratio of the shadow cost of a marginal increase
in the labor tax to the shadow cost of raising government revenues through the labor
tax. The marginal cost of public funds15 (MCPF) defined as the marginal welfare cost of
taxation plus the primary or direct cost, can be written from (3.20) as MCPF = 1+m.16
Using the elasticity of labor supply (ετwL ), we rewrite the marginal cost of public funds as
MCPF = 1/(1+ ετwL ). Note that the MCPF is increasing in the elasticity of labor supply.
Therefore, the more elastic the supply of labor, the higher the cost of raising government
revenues from labor taxes.
Regarding expression (3.18), it decomposes the welfare change when the decrease of
the fare is financed by labor taxes, and it is equivalent to (3.11) in previous section.17 There
are two main differences between (3.18) and (3.11). The first difference is the term dW RFpB
which is the welfare loss from the (marginal) revenue-financing effect. This is the product
of the marginal welfare cost of taxation and the incremental reduction of the fare (taking
into account both, lost tax revenues and the cost of subsidizing the induced demand). That
is, the welfare cost of financing the reduction of the fare by increasing the labor tax relative
to increasing the lump-sum tax.
The second difference between (3.18) and (3.11) is that the effect on labor supply is
now multiplied by the MCPF . That is, the gain on the labor market is now the sum of
15The MCPF measures the cost of each unit of government revenue, taking account of the deadweight
loss from the additional taxes needed to raise that revenue. A unitary MCPF means that obtaining an euro
of government revenue involves a one-euro sacrifice of private income. If an increase in public revenues
erodes the base of pre-existing distortionary taxes it imposes a cost over the revenues collected and results on
a MCPF higher than one. Detailed explanations can be found in Auerbach and Hines (2002); Bovenberg and
Goulder (2002); Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994).
16This formulation is similar to that used in Goulder et al. (1997); Parry (1998).
17Expression (3.18) is also equivalent to the welfare decomposition of an analogous environmental subsidy
derived in Parry (1998). The four welfare components can be traced back in equation (12) of his paper.
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the primary-labor effect (dW PLpB in (3.11)) and an efficiency gain of mτw(dB/d f ). dW
LI
pB is
therefore the labor-tax interaction effect and amounts to the gain in the labor market from
more valuable tax revenue as measured by the MCPF .
Expression (3.19), on the other hand, is the welfare change from the increase of
frequency, and it is the equivalent to (3.12) in previous section. The effects related to
the use of distortionary taxation are similar to the two effects described for the optimal
fare. The revenue-financing effect dW RFf , and the labor-tax-interaction effect dW
LI
f . The
revenue-financing effect is the cost of the instrument multiplied by the marginal welfare
cost of taxation, dW RFf = mdW
PC
f .
Then, solving (3.18) for pB, we get
pB =
1
1− ετwL /εPBB
[
(cB− τw)+(1+ε τwL )
UtL
UX
β
BN
f
]
. (3.21)
Expression (3.21) is the optimal fare financed through the labor tax. The first part of
the fare (i.e. the first term on the right-hand side) is a revenue-raising (Ramsey) component
that depends on the elasticity of labor supply and the elasticity of public transport demand
with respect to the fare. This term measures the social contribution of public transport to
government revenues as the fare is now seen as another source of government revenues.
In particular, the fare is positive and higher than that implied by (3.13) if |ετwL |< |εPBB |.
If in contrast, |ετwL |> |εPBB |, the revenue-raising factor is negative and calls for a negative
fare. However, as in this case we are only considering public transport, ετwL = ε
τw
B and
it is difficult to determine the relationship between ετwB and ε
pB
B . One possibility is that
ετwB ≈ ε pBB and that the revenue raising effect cancels out (yielding to (3.13)). The effect of
this term will become clear in next subsection when both modes are analyzed.
Note that the Pigouvian component (only the dwell effect in this case) is now divided
by the MCPF . This is a well-known result in the environmental taxation literature,18 and
implies that the revenue raising function of the fare becomes more important as the MCPF
increases and less attention is paid to the correction of the externality (only the dwell
externality in this case). This correction can also be expected when congestion externalities
are included in the analysis (next subsection).
18See e.g. Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) for their work in environmental taxation, and Calthrop (2001)
and Van Dender (2003) for applications in transport pricing.
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Turning now to the optimal frequency financed by labor taxes ( fLT ), we get
fLT =
√√√√
(1+ε τwL )
(α+βBN)UtLUX BN
c0
+
(
Γ
pBBN
c0
)2
+ Γ
pBBN
c0
, (3.22)
where
Γ=−1
2
ετwL ε
f
B
ε pBB
.
This expression is somehow more complex than (3.14), although it still follows the
square root principle.19 The first term is the same as in (3.14) but now divided by the
MCPF . In this case, the role of the higher cost of government revenues can be interpreted
as follows. The MCPF multiplies operator costs (c0), as providing an additional vehicle
becomes more expensive when distortionary taxation has to be used. To the extent that
increasing the frequency requires an increase of the labor tax, which discourages work
effort, the social cost of providing an extra-unit of frequency is higher than its explicit cost.
The benefit-cost ratio of increasing the frequency is therefore reduced compared to (3.14),
which means that the weight of user’s benefits in the optimal frequency expression is
reduced. Note that the more elastic the labor supply, the higher the MCPF , and the lower is
this component of the optimal frequency. As noticed by Oakland (1987), tax considerations
might reduce the level of marginal social benefits needed to justify the expansion of the
service.
It is worth noting that a similar result was found in Jara-Díaz and Gschwender (2009)
when analyzing the optimal design of public transport under financial constraints. They
find that constraining operators’ costs to a given level diminishes the role of the values of
waiting and in-vehicle time savings in the optimal-frequency expression.20 In their case,
users’ benefits from the increase of the frequency are divided by a term that is higher than
one and that increases as the budget for public transport provision is reduced. Therefore,
the tighter the budget, the lower the weight of user costs in the optimal frequency.
One of the issues that emerges from comparing these findings is that using distortionary
taxation to finance the provision of public transport can be equivalent to imposing a
financial constraint on its provision. This seems to be reasonable as the MCPF measures
19The optimal frequency in (3.22) is the positive root of a quadratic expression (see Appendix 3.C). Note
that f depends now explicitly on pB which in turns depends on f .
20Jara-Díaz and Gschwender (2009) also derive optimal conditions for the capacity of the vehicle. These
conditions follow the same reasoning in terms of the effect of the financial constraint on the values of waiting
and in-vehicle time savings.
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the scarcity of public funds. In Jara-Díaz and Gschwender (2009), the optimal fare only
depends on the first term21 in (3.22), so that the ultimate effect of the financial constraint
is to reduce the frequency. In our case, however, the frequency also depends on the effect
of another term that appears twice in this expression (ΓpBBN/c0).
Turning now to this term, it is the ratio of total fare revenues to vehicle cost, pBBN/c0,
multiplied by Γ. That is, the number of vehicles that could be financed by fare revenues
diminished by a factor Γ. Note that Γ is the ratio of the involved demand elasticities22
(ε fBε
τw
L /ε
pB
B ) multiplied by −0.5. To illustrate the possible range of values that Γ can take
one can assume that, in absolute value, the involved demand elasticities are in the interval
(0,1) so that their ratio multiplied by −0.5 should yield −1 < Γ< 0. This would mean
that only a fraction of the ratio of total fare revenues to vehicle cost enters into the optimal
frequency expression.
Intuitively, this term reflects the effect on fare revenues from the simultaneous change
of the frequency, the fare and the labor tax (which all have an effect on the demand).
It seems that the role of this term in (3.22) is to further reduce the level of the optimal
frequency to be provided. Under economies of scale in the provision of public transport,
marginal cost pricing creates a deficit. Financing this deficit is straightforward if lump-sum
taxes are available because it can be financed without a deadweight loss. However, this not
the case when distortionary taxes are used.
Note that if labor supply is inelastic (i.e. ετwL = 0), the optimal frequency financed by
labor taxes (3.22) equals that financed by lump-sum taxes (3.14).
Public transport and car use with unpriced car externalities
We now derive the welfare effects of incremental decreases of pB and increases of f when
unpriced car externalities are considered (see Appendix 3.C). Welfare expressions are as
21Expression (3.22) is equivalent to equation (20) in Jara-Díaz and Gschwender (2009). More specifically,
the first term in (3.22) is similar to their expression when the cost of increasing vehicle size is zero, which is
the case in our model as we assume vehicle capacity to be fixed.
22As was explained earlier, in this particular case ετwL = ε
τw
B .
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follows:
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(3.24)
Note that, in this case, the components of m are L = A+B and dL/dτw = dA/dτw+
dB/τw, as both modes are used.
In these welfare expressions, we get again the terms dWCNpB and dW
CN
f that account
for the welfare gain from reduced road congestion. We also get the labor-tax interaction
effects dW LIpB and dW
LI
f , that take into account the total effect on labor supply (changes on
the use of both modes), and which are multiplied by the MCPF . Interpretation combines
the elements already provided for (3.15) and (3.16), in what concerns the introduction of
road externalities, and those provided for (3.18) and (3.19) for the effects of m.
Solving for the optimal fare, we get
pB =
1
1− ετwL /εPBB
[
(cB− τw (1+ϒ))+(1+ε τwL )
(
UtL
UX
β
f
BN+
UtL
UX
ηANϒ
)]
. (3.25)
This expression combines the effects of the reduction of road congestion externalities
derived in (3.17) and the revenue raising term derived in (3.21). As expected, the externality
correction term is also divided by the MCPF .
Note that now, as long as there are two modes to commute, we can expect the elasticity
of labor supply to be lower than the fare elasticity (ετwL < ε
PB
B ), and the revenue raising
term to be higher than one. This is in line with estimates that typically situate the labor
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supply elasticity in the −0.1 to −0.2 range23 (Dahlby, 2008) and fare elasticities in the
−0.2 to −0.4 range (Small and Gomez-Ibanez, 1999; Small and Verhoef, 2007).
The optimal fare therefore trades off the reduction of the road congestion externality
against the need for scarce revenues. The reduction of the externality implies setting the
fare below the social marginal cost of supplying the service, but the need for revenues
increases the resulting level of the fare, up to the point where the elasticity of labor supply
enables so. Therefore, the fare is likely to be above marginal social costs if the power
of public transit subsidies to reduce road congestion is modest. This depends on the
cross-elasticity of demand for automobile trips with respect to public transport fares (which
is low, e.g. less than 0.02 in absolute value).
The optimal frequency is the same as in (3.22) if, again, the optimal fare in (3.25) is
applied and under the assumption that ε fA/ε
f
B = ε
pB
A /ε
pB
B . The partial self-financing effect
that applies for (3.22) finds all its relevance in this case.
3.5 Second-best pricing with heterogeneous commuters
Assuming homogeneous commuters in a second-best analysis seems somehow contradic-
tory since, in this case, the government should be able to redistribute income in a lump-sum
way. In this section we analyze second-best optimal pricing with heterogeneous commuters.
Heterogeneity is introduced through differences in labor productivity. To do so, we add
the following notation to that already introduced in Section 3.2. There are two types of
commuters, with ni of type i = ℓ,h, where ℓ and h represent low-income and high-income
types (∑ni = N). They only differ in their labor productivity ei, which is assumed to be
private information that cannot be verified by the government. The government only has
access to households’ labor earnings defined as ω i = wei, where w is the gross daily wage
per productivity unit. Equal labor tax rates are assumed for both types of commuters.24
Commuters’ variables and parameters are indexed by i. The social welfare function is
defined as W = ∑θ iniυ i, where θ i is the social weight given by the government to the
utility of each kind of commuter (∑θ i = 1). The budget constraint in (3.10) becomes
pB∑
i
niBi+ τw∑
i
niω i(Ai+Bi)+NτLS = F¯ + f c0+ cB∑
i
niBi. (3.26)
23These are aggregate uncompensated values accepted in the literature. However, uncertainty still reminds
regarding the effects of tax rate changes on labor supply. A detailed explanation of this topic can be found in
Dahlby (2008).
24This assumption is relaxed in the numerical illustration in next section.
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Again, the left-hand side represents government revenues and the right-hand side
government expenditures.
A simple case is considered: low-income commuters use both car and public transport,
whereas high-income commuters only use car.25 Closed-form expressions are derived only
for pB, f will be determined numerically in next section.
The optimal fare when financing transit subsidies with lump-sum taxes is as follows
pB =
1
1−φLSϑξ ℓ
[
(1−φLSϑ)
(
cB−ωℓτw
(
1+ϒℓ
))
+
UℓtL
UℓX
(
β
f
Bℓ+ηAℓϒℓ
)]
, (3.27)
where φLS = nh/N, ϑ = 1− (UhX/UℓX)(θ h/θ ℓ), ξ ℓ = 1+ 1/ε pBBℓ , and ϒℓ = Aℓε
PB
Aℓ
/BℓεPB
Bℓ
(see Appendix 3.D).
If instead, the subsidy is financed by labor taxes, the optimal fare is as follows
pB =
1
1−φLTϑξ ℓ
[
(1−φLTϑ)
(
cB−ωℓτw
(
1+ϒℓ
))
+
UℓtL
UℓX
(
β
f
Bℓ+ηAℓϒℓ
)]
, (3.28)
where φLT = nhωhAh/(nℓωℓ(Aℓ+Bℓ)+nhωhAh) (see Appendix 3.D).
In these expressions, the main terms are the same as those derived in expressions (3.17)
and (3.25). That is, the optimal fare is a deviation of the marginal social cost of a trip plus
the cost of the congestion externality that is reduced from the road per rider diverted from
car to public transport. The deviation depends, in this case, on the government distributive
concerns. These distributive concerns are determined by the ratio of the marginal utility
of income of both kinds of commuters (UhX/U
ℓ
X ) and the relative social weight given to a
unit of utility of a rich individual with respect to a poor individual (θ h/θ ℓ). In the case of
lump-sum taxes, these redistribution concerns also depend on the share of the high-income
group in the economy (φLS), whereas they depend on the amount of labor supplied by this
group (φLT ) in the case of labor tax financing.
These expressions therefore incorporate both efficiency and equity considerations,
although in a rather complicated way. If the fare could be adjusted at its optimal level
given these considerations, the next step would be to adjust the frequency of service for
the same considerations. This, however, is a less straightforward exercise. A numerical
illustration is therefore useful.
25This assumption is relaxed in the numerical illustration in next section.
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3.6 Numerical illustration
In order to illustrate the welfare effects of subsidizing public transit by lump-sum and labor
taxes, we apply the model developed above with heterogeneous commuters. Computations
have been based on stylized facts about cost structures and time functions. Commuters
have identical utility functions specified as
U i(X i, t iL,A
i,Bi) = (α iX X
i
σ i−1
σ i +(1−α iX)t iL
σ i−1
σ i )
σ i
σ i−1 +(α iAA
i+α iBB
i). (3.1′)
The elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption is given by σ i and
the marginal disutility of commuting by α iA and α
i
B. Modes can be perfect or imperfect
substitutes (i.e. α iA = α
i
B or α
i
A ̸= α iB). Parameter values are summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Base-case parameter values
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Utility function Time function tB
α iX , i = ℓ,h 0.16, 0.16 α 2
σ i, i = ℓ,h 1.52, 1.52 β0 0.2
α iA, i = ℓ,h -1, -0.1 β 5E-3
α iB, i = ℓ,h -1, -1
Labor market Time function tA
ei, i = ℓ,h 0.25, 1 η0 0.1
τ iw, i = ℓ,h [%] 22, 30 η 2.5E-9
We assume, for our base-case scenario, that low-income commuters are indifferent to
both modes (αℓA = α
ℓ
B), whereas high-income commuters have a slight preference for car
(αhA > α
h
B). This is consistent with microdata on households that show that income is a
major determinant of travel mode and automobile ownership. Higher real incomes make the
door-to-door convenience, privacy and amenities of the automobile more affordable (Small
and Gomez-Ibanez, 1999), whereas lower incomes are associated with more dependency
on modes other than the automobile.
As we ignore mutual congestion between modes, the public transport option can be
seen as buses using dedicated lanes (rail modes, such as metro or train, can also be an
option but operator costs might be higher than those considered here). Both congestion
and dwell time costs are assumed to be linear functions of passenger density on the road
(one passenger per car) and in the buses. Parameters of the time functions are such that
the free-flow speeds, (60 km/h for car and 30 km/h for bus), are reduced to one-third for
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cars and two-thirds for buses at peak traffic conditions. Based on evidence summarized in
Small and Verhoef (2007), waiting time is assumed twice as high as in-vehicle time (i.e.
α = 2).
We assume the proportion of low-productivity workers in the economy to be higher (65
%). Labor productivity (ei), which is the source of differences between workers, is higher
for high-income workers. In the initial distribution of income, the government imposes
already a higher labor tax for high-income workers than for low-income workers (30% vs.
22%).
Our starting point is a reference case where the transit fare equals operator costs per
trip (i.e. pB = cB). Next, we impose an exogenous subsidy that increases gradually from
5% to 100%. The frequency of public transport service is optimized for each subsidy
level given consumer’s choices. Either a lump-sum tax or an increase of the labor tax are
imposed, in a revenue neutral way, to finance the subsidy and the increase of the frequency
(relative to the reference case).
Figure 3.1 shows the number of trips per mode (per household type) as a function of
the subsidy. Only results for increases of the labor tax are reported as the results from
lump-sum taxes are very similar in terms of mode use. At the reference equilibrium (zero
subsidy), both types of households commute mainly by automobile and to a lower extent
by public transport. Low-income commuters make around 40% of their trips by public
transport, whereas high-income commuters only 31%.
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Figure. 3.1 Trips per commuter per mode (labor-tax funding)
When a subsidy is given, low-income commuters exchange trips by car for trips by bus,
whereas high-income commuters keep almost fixed the number of trips on both modes.
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Changes can be better appreciated in Figure 3.2 where the change on the number of trips
per mode are expressed as a percentage of their level at the reference equilibrium. Note
that the increase in the number of trips by bus of low-income commuters is higher than
the reduction of their number of trips by car. Therefore, the reduction of the fare and the
improvement of the frequency not only result in a decrease of car travel but also in a net
increase in total commuting trips for the low-income group and to a much smaller extent
also for the high-income group.
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Figure. 3.2 Change in trips per mode per commuter (labor-tax funding)
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Figure. 3.3 Change in travel time per trip (labor-tax financing)
The reduction of car use induced by the subsidy seems nevertheless limited (solid line
in Figure 3.3). At the reference equilibrium, the round commuting trip takes 2h by car
and 2.5h by bus (waiting and in-vehicle time). The average speed is 24 and 22km/h for
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car and bus, respectively.26 When the subsidy is 50% of operator costs, for instance, the
reduction of travel time per trip is around 4% (5min saved per trip) and it is around 8%
(10min saved per trip) when the fare is completely subsidized. On the other hand, dwell
time increases (dashed line in Figure 3.3) as giving a transit subsidy increases the demand
for public transport and this effect is only partially compensated by the increase of the
frequency of service (e.g. there is a 1 and 2% increase of bus travel time for a subsidy of
50 and 100%, respectivelly).
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Figure. 3.4 Labor supply (Li, i = ℓ,h) per i-type commuter (left) and aggregate (right).
Turning now to the effects on the labor market, labor supply increases for both types of
commuters and both policies (Figure 3.4), but this increase is more important when using
lump-sum taxes, because with this scheme there is an increase for the net return on labor
supply. This is particularly accentuated for low-income workers (left panel of Figure 3.4)
and it is also the case at the aggregate level (right panel of Figure 3.4). Even if the increase
of labor supply is lower when using labor taxes, this positive effect on the labor market
might offset part of the welfare loss of this financing scheme.
Regarding welfare effects, Figure 3.5 shows the change in individual welfare, in
monetary terms, compared with the reference equilibrium. Note that the benefits from each
scheme accrue to different income groups. Whereas low-income commuters benefit more
from labor tax funding, high-income commuters benefit more from lump-sum tax funding.
For for high-income commuters, however, welfare gains from both policies are very close.
This is because the high-income group benefits basically from the reduction of congestion
26The distance is assumed to be the same when commuting by car and by bus (50km), but the free-flow
speed is assumed to be higher for car.
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Figure. 3.5 Change in utility per type of commuter for both financing policies
which is very similar for both financing schemes. Interestingly, for the low-income group
a low subsidy financed through the labor tax is more beneficial than a higher one financed
through lump-sum taxes. For instance note that, a subsidy of 90% of the fare financed
through lump-sum taxes gives around the same utility (110e/year) than a subsidy of only
35% of the fare financed through the labor tax.
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Figure. 3.6 Change in total welfare for both policies
At the aggregate level, the welfare gain (obtained by the unweighted aggregation of
utilities) is higher with labor-tax funding (Figure 3.6). These results imply an optimal
zero fare for commuting trips in either of the two financing cases.27 As a high labor tax is
27Welfare gains can be even achieved with a subsidy that is beyond the 100% level. These simulations,
however, are restricted to non-negative fares.
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already paid per day of work it might be optimal to subsidize commuting trips. Similar
results were also found by Basso and Silva (2014) in simulations for bus fares in London.28
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Figure. 3.7 Change in frequency for both financing policies
Finally, we present the variation of the frequency of service given the subsidy (Fig-
ure 3.7). As expected, the optimal frequency under lump-sum financing is higher than that
with labor-tax financing. This is basically because the increase of labor supply, and so the
demand for public transport, is higher with this scheme (right panel of Figure 3.4). Note
that the increase of the demand for public transport comes fundamentally from the increase
of labor supply from the low-income group. Therefore, it is the low-income group which
might mainly benefit from the increase of the frequency, although as shown in Figure 3.3,
the increase of the frequency does not completely compensates the increase of demand for
public tansport.
3.7 Implications of using distortionary taxation to finance
public transport systems
This chapter has examined the issues raised by a preexisting tax on labor and unpriced
automobile congestion for the design of public transport systems (optimal fare and fre-
quency of service). As governments are usually involved in the financing and operation of
public transport, these issues include not only the efficiency cost of financing a subsidy
but also the setting of fares and the optimal provision of the service. Our results shed
28Basso and Silva (2014) find optimal fares beyond the 100% level but limit their report to the zero fare.
Optimal subsidies for buses in London beyond the 90% level are also reported by Parry and Small (2009).
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light on the effects of using distortionary taxation for the public finance operations. Only
commuting trips are considered. Despite a rather simplified public transport representation,
clear implications for policy design can be drawn.
If distributional and financing concerns are ignored, and if road congestion can be
directly priced, the first-best decision is to set public transport fares equal to the marginal
social cost of a trip (equation (3.13)). When congestion externalities cannot be charged
to car drivers, the second-best alternative is to reduce public transport fares by the value
of the road congestion externality that is reduced per trip attracted to public transport
(equation (3.17)). This means giving a subsidy to public transport. Whenever labor taxes
are involved in the financing of the subsidy, the amount of the subsidy should be corrected
by the efficiency cost of using distortionary taxation, i.e. the MCPF (equation (3.25)) .
This results in a lower subsidy, such as it happens with the analog environmental subsidy
(e.g. Parry, 1998). The optimal fare can be even set above the marginal social cost of a trip
if the sensibility of the demand with respect to the fare and labor supply allows to raise
public revenues through the fare.
The effect of the MCPF on the optimal transit subsidy seems to have been taken into
account only in very recent literature (e.g. Basso and Silva, 2014; Parry and Small, 2009).
However, to date, no attention has been given to the effect of the MCPF in the provision
of the service. Our results put the MCPF in a broader context, by establishing its effects
on operational variables such as frequency (equation (3.22)). This relationship can be
understood through the following channel. Subsidizing public transport might yield an
increase of public transport demand, which in turn might induce an increase in frequency
of service (through the Mohring effect). Increasing the frequency requires public funds and
these funds are more expensive when distortionary taxation has to be used. Therefore, if it
is recognized that correcting the level of the subsidy by the MCPF is essential, it should
also be recognized that correcting the frequency of the service by the MCPF is essential.
This result provides an explanation for a similar effect found by Jara-Díaz and Gschwen-
der (2009) when studying financial constraints in the design of public transport. They
specifically noticed that imposing a financial constraint on operators’ expenses reduces
the role of users’ time savings in the optimal frequency by a factor that increases with the
constraint. This implies a reduction of the frequency of service compared to the optimal
social level. They conclude that this is an inferior solution with respect to the optimal
social level. Our results, however, show that if this financial constraint arises from scarcity
of government revenues, it can be optimal from a social point of view to adjust the level of
the frequency according to the constraint.
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When distributional concerns are taken into account, not only efficiency but also equity
considerations determine the level of the optimal subsidy (equations (3.27) and (3.28)).
Unfortunately, determining the role of these considerations on the frequency of service
is difficult given the complexity of the derivations. However, our numerical simulations
seem to confirm that, even in the case of heterogeneous commuters, the frequency of
service is lower under labor-tax financing compared to lump-sum tax financing. Moreover,
labor-tax financing favors the low-income group in the economy despite the fact that under
this financing scheme the optimal subsidy and the optimal frequency might be lower than
when lump-sum taxes are used. This is basically because under labor-tax financing the
high-income group supports the cost of the reform whereas the low-income group gets its
benefits.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter has derived optimal design rules for urban public transport systems when
congestion cannot be directly priced and the system is financed through distortionary labor
taxes. Both optimal pricing and service provision rules for commuting trips were derived
in such a framework. Regarding the optimal pricing rule, our results confirm those from
the environmental taxation literature in that, if a subsidy is justified to reduce unpriced
road congestion externalities, it has to be corrected by its distortionary effect on the labor
market. Regarding the service provision rule, our results show that a similar correction
has to be applied since financial considerations might reduce the level of marginal social
benefits needed to justify a certain level of service. Distributional concerns, nevertheless,
appear to favor the financing of public transport systems through labor taxes even under a
lower subsidy and a lower provision of service. Through labor-tax financing the benefits of
increased subsidization and improved service accrue mainly to the less productive workers,
whereas the cost of the scheme is mainly borne by the most productive workers.
This analysis shows how the use of distortionary taxation to finance public transport
services affects the design of the service. As labor taxes are one of the conventional sources
used for funding public transport, this issue should be of central importance in the analysis
of public transport systems. There has, however, been little discussion of this issue in the
transport economics field.
Our work sheds light on the relationship between public finance constraints and public
transport operational variables. Such a relationship seems to have been neglected until
now. An issue that limits our analysis, however, is that only the case when car and public
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transport operate in isolated infrastructures is analyzed. In mixed traffic conditions, public
transport imposes extra delays on car traffic and this should be taken into account in the
definition of the optimal fare and the optimal frequency of service. Further research could
usefully explore how this assumption affects the design of the system under financial
constraints and equity considerations.
Appendix 3.A The household’s problem
The household’s problem defined by (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) can be solved by maximizing
the following Lagrange function:
L =U (X , tL)+Ψ(A,B)−λc [X + cAA+ pBB+ τLS− (1− τw)(A+B)]
+µc [t¯−A(1+ tA)−B(1+ tB)− tL] ,
where the Lagrange multiplier related to the income constraint (λc) is the marginal utility
of income, and the Lagrange multiplier related to the time constraint (µc) is the resource
value of time. For X ,A,B, tL > 0, the system of first-order conditions is
∂L
∂X
=UX −λc = 0 ⇒ λc =UX
∂L
∂ tL
=UtL −µc = 0 ⇒ µc =UtL
∂L
∂A
=ΨA−λc [cA− (1− τw)]−µc(1+ tA) = 0
∂L
∂B
=ΨB−λc [pB− (1− τw)]−µc(1+ tB) = 0
(3.29)
Using these conditions and both budget constraints, we obtain the demand functions
for X ,A,B, tL. Replacing these functions in the utility gives the indirect utility function
υ(cA, pB,τw,τLS, tA, tB, f ) which enables rewriting the household’s problem as:
L = υ(·)+λc [X + cAA+ pBB+ τLS− (1− τw)(A+B)]
−µc [t¯−A(1+ tA)−B(1+ tB)− tL] .
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F.O.C.:
∂L
∂ pB
= υpB +λcB = 0 ⇒υpB =−UX B
∂L
∂τw
= υτw +λc(A+B) = 0 ⇒υτw =−UX(A+B)
∂L
∂τLS
= υτLS +λc = 0 ⇒υτLS =−UX
∂L
∂ tA
= υtA +µcA = 0 ⇒υtA =−UtLA
∂L
∂ tB
= υtB +µcB = 0 ⇒υtB =−UtLB
∂L
∂ f
= υ f +µc
∂ tB
∂ f
B = 0 ⇒υ f =−UtL
∂ tB
∂ f
B
(3.30)
We also define, based on equations (3.4) and (3.5), the following partial derivates
∂ tA
∂A
= η ;
∂ tB
∂B
=
β
f
N;
∂ tB
∂ f
=− α
f 2
− β
f 2
BN+
β
f
dB
d f
N (3.31)
Appendix 3.B Second-best pricing with lump-sum taxes
In this section we derive the marginal welfare effects of variations of pB and f when they
are balanced by a change of τLS.
Public transport only
Welfare change from a reduction of the fare
Totally differentiating W with respect to pB gives
dW
d pB
= υpB +υtB
∂ tB
∂B
dB
d pB
+υτLS
dτLS
d pB
(3.32)
Replacing (3.30) and (3.31) into (3.32) gives
dW
d pB
=−UX B−UtL
β
f
BN
dB
d pB
−UX dτLSd pB (3.33)
By differentiating (3.10) with respect to pB we get dτLS/d pB
dτLS
d pB
= cB
dB
d pB
− τw dBd pB − pB
dB
d pB
−B (3.34)
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By inserting (3.34) into (3.33) and dividing by UX we get (3.11). Then, equating (3.11) to
zero and solving for pB gives (3.13).
Welfare change from an increase of the frequency
Differentiating W with respect to f gives
dW
d f
= υ f +υτLS
dτLS
d f
(3.35)
Replacing (3.30) and (3.31) into (3.35) gives
dW
d f
=−UtL
(
− α
f 2
− β
f 2
BN+
β
f
dB
d f
N
)
B−UX dτLSd f (3.36)
By differentiating (3.10) with respect to f we get
dτLS
d f
=
c0
N
+ cB
dB
d f
− pB dBd f − τw
dB
d f
(3.37)
By inserting (3.37) into (3.36) and dividing by UX we get (3.12). Then, equating (3.12) to
zero gives the following frequency optimality condition (solving it for f gives (3.14)).
UtL
UX
(α+βBN)
BN
f 2
= c0 (3.38)
Public transport and car use
Welfare change from a reduction of the fare
Totally differentiating W with respect to pB gives
dW
d pB
= υpB +υtB
∂ tB
∂B
dB
d pB
+υtA
∂ tA
∂A
dA
d pB
+υτLS
dτLS
d pB
(3.39)
Replacing (3.30) and (3.31) into (3.39) gives
dW
d pB
=−UX B−UtL
β
f
BN
dB
d pB
−UtLηAN
dA
d pB
−UX dτLSd pB (3.40)
By differentiating (3.10) with respect to pB we get
dτLS
d pB
= cB
dB
d pB
− τw
(
dA
d pB
+
dB
d pB
)
− pB dBd pB −B (3.41)
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By inserting (3.41) into (3.40), and dividing by UX we get (3.15). Then, equating (3.15) to
zero, defining
ε pBA =
dA
d pB
pB
A
; ε pBB =
dB
d pB
pB
B
(3.42)
and solving for pB gives (3.17).
Welfare change from an increase of the frequency
Differentiating W with respect to f gives
dW
d f
= υ f +υtA
∂ tA
∂A
∂A
∂ f
+υτLS
dτLS
d f
(3.43)
Replacing (3.30) and (3.31) into (3.43) gives
dW
d f
=−UtL
(
− α
f 2
− β
f 2
BN+
β
f
dB
d f
N
)
B−UtLηAN
∂A
∂ f
−UX dτLSd f (3.44)
By differentiating (3.10) with respect to f we get
dτLS
d f
=
c0
N
+ cB
dB
d f
− pB dBd f − τw
(
dA
d f
+
dB
d f
)
(3.45)
By inserting (3.45) into (3.44), and dividing by UX we get (3.16). Then, equating (3.16) to
zero, using (3.42), defining
ε fA =
dA
d f
f
A
; ε fB =
dB
d f
f
B
(3.46)
and setting ε fA/ε
f
B = ε
pB
A /ε
pB
B gives the same optimality condition as in (3.38) and the same
optimal frequency as in (3.14).
Appendix 3.C Second-best pricing with labor taxes
In this section we derive the marginal welfare effects of variations of pB and f when they
are balanced by a change of τw.
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Public transport only
Welfare change from a reduction of the fare
Totally differentiating W with respect to pB gives
dW
d pB
= υpB +υtB
∂ tB
∂B
dB
d pB
+υτw
dτw
d pB
(3.47)
Replacing (3.30) and (3.31) into (3.47) gives
dW
d pB
=−UX B−UtL
β
f
BN
dB
d pB
−UX B dτwd pB (3.48)
By differentiating (3.10) with respect to pB we get
B+ pB
dB
d pB
+
dτw
d pB
B+ τw
(
dB
dτw
dτw
d pB
+
dB
d pB
)
= cB
dB
d pB
(3.49)
Solving for dτw/d pB
dτw
d pB
=
1
B+ τw dBdτw
[
cB
dB
d pB
− τw dBd pB − pB
dB
d pB
−B
]
(3.50)
Inserting (3.50) into (3.48), dividing by UX , and using (3.20) we get (3.18). Equating (3.18)
to zero, using (3.42), defining
ε τwL =
dL
dτw
τw
L
(3.51)
and solving for pB we get (3.21).
Welfare change from an increase of the frequency
Differentiating W with respect to f gives
dW
d f
= υ f +υτw
dτw
d f
(3.52)
Replacing (3.30) and (3.31) into (3.52) gives
dW
d f
=−UtL
(
− α
f 2
− β
f 2
BN+
β
f
dB
d f
N
)
B−UX dτwd f (3.53)
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Differentiating (3.10) with respect to f gives
pB
dB
d f
+
dτw
d f
B+ τw
(
dB
dτw
dτw
dB
+
dB
d f
)
=
c0
N
+ cB
dB
d f
(3.54)
Solving for dτw/d f givers
dτw
d f
=
1
B+ τw dBdτw
[
c0
N
+ cB
dB
d f
− pB dBd f − τw
dB
d f
]
(3.55)
By inserting (3.55) into (3.53) and dividing by UX we get (3.19). Then, equating (3.19) to
zero and using (3.20), (3.42), (3.46) and (3.51) gives the following frequency optimality
condition (
1
1+ ετwL
)
c0
N
f 2+
(
ετwL
1+ ετwL
)
ε fB
ε pBB
BpB f −UtLUX (α+βBN)B = 0 (3.56)
Solving it for f and choosing the positive root gives (3.22). Note that f , as defined in (3.22),
is always positive. Define, for instance,
a =
(1+ ετwL )(α+βB)
UtL
UX
BN
c0
; b = Γ
pBBN
c0
so that (3.22) can be rewritten as
√
a+b2 +b. Note that for a≥ 0, √a+b2 +b≥ 0.
Public transport and car use
Welfare change from a reduction of the fare
Totally differentiating W with respect to pB gives
dW
d pB
= υpB +υtB
∂ tB
∂B
dB
d pB
+υtA
∂ tA
∂A
dA
d pB
+υτw
dτw
d pB
(3.57)
Replacing (3.30) and (3.31) into (3.57) gives
dW
d pB
=−UX B−UtL
β
f
BN
dB
d pB
−UtLηAN
dA
d pB
−UX(A+B)dτwd pB (3.58)
By differentiating (3.10) with respect to pB we get
B+ pB
dB
d pB
+
dτw
d pB
(A+B)+ τw
(
dA
dτw
dτw
d pB
+
dB
dτw
dτw
d pB
+
dA
d pB
+
dB
d pB
)
= cB
dB
d pB
(3.59)
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dτw
d pB
=
1
L+ τw dLdτw
[
cB
dB
d pB
− τw
(
dA
d pB
+
dB
d pB
)
− pB dBd pB −B
]
(3.60)
By inserting (3.60) into (3.58), and dividing by UX we get (3.23). Then, equating (3.23) to
zero, using (3.42) and solving for pB gives (3.25).
Welfare change from an increase of the frequency
Differentiating W with respect to f gives
dW
d f
= υ f +υtA
∂ tA
∂A
∂A
∂ f
+υτw
dτw
d f
(3.61)
Replacing (3.30) and (3.31) into (3.61) gives
dW
d f
=−UtL
(
− α
f 2
− β
f 2
BN+
β
f
dB
d f
N
)
B−UtLηAN
∂A
∂ f
−UX(A+B)dτwd f (3.62)
By differentiating (3.10) with respect to f we get
pB
dB
d f
+
dτw
d f
(A+B)+ τw
(
dA
dτw
dτw
d f
+
dB
dτw
dτw
d f
+
dA
d f
+
dB
d f
)
=
c0
N
+ cB
dB
d f
(3.63)
dτw
d f
=
1
L+ τw dLdτw
[
c0
N
+ cB
dB
d f
− pB dBd f − τw
(
dA
d f
+
dB
d f
)]
(3.64)
By inserting (3.64) into (3.62), and dividing by UX we get (3.24). Then, equating (3.24)
to zero, using (3.42) and (3.46), and setting ε fA/ε
f
B = ε
pB
A /ε
pB
B gives the same optimality
condition as in (3.56) and the same optimal frequency as in (3.22).
Appendix 3.D Second-best pricing with heterogeneous com-
muters
Optimal fare financed by lump-sum taxes
Totally differentiating W with respect to pB gives
dW
d pB
= θ ℓnℓ
(
υℓpB +υ
ℓ
tB
∂ tB
∂Bℓ
dBℓ
d pB
+υℓtA
∂ tA
∂Aℓ
dAℓ
d pB
+υℓτLS
dτLS
d pB
)
+θ hnhυhτLS
dτLS
d pB
(3.65)
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Replacing (3.30) and (3.31) into (3.65) gives
dW
d pB
=−θ ℓnℓ
(
UℓX B
ℓ+UℓtL
β
f
BℓN
dBℓ
d pB
+UℓtLηA
ℓN
dAℓ
d pB
)
−
(
θ ℓnℓUℓX +θ
hnhUhX
) dτLS
d pB
(3.66)
By differentiating (3.26) with respect to pB we get
dτLS
d pB
=
nℓ
N
[
cB
dBℓ
d pB
− τwωℓ
(
dAℓ
d pB
+
dBℓ
d pB
)
− pB dB
ℓ
d pB
−Bℓ
]
(3.67)
By inserting (3.67) into (3.66), dividing by UℓX , equating (dW/d pB)/U
ℓ
X to zero, and
solving for pB gives (3.27) .
Optimal fare financed by labor taxes
Totally differentiating W with respect to pB gives
dW
d pB
= θ ℓnℓ
(
υℓpB +υ
ℓ
tB
∂ tB
∂Bℓ
dBℓ
d pB
+υℓtA
∂ tA
∂Aℓ
dAℓ
d pB
+υℓτx
dτx
d pB
)
+θ hnhυhτx
dτx
d pB
(3.68)
Replacing (3.30) and (3.31) into (3.68) gives
dW
d pB
=−θ ℓnℓ
(
UℓX B
ℓ+UℓtL
β
f
BℓN
dBℓ
d pB
+UℓtLηA
ℓN
dAℓ
d pB
)
−
(
θ ℓnℓωℓ(Aℓ+Bℓ)UℓX +θ
hnhωhAhUhX
) dτLS
d pB
(3.69)
By differentiating (3.26) with respect to pB, and ignoring the marginal welfare cost of
taxation, we get
dτw
d pB
=
nℓ
nℓωℓ(Aℓ+Bℓ)+nhωhAh
[
cB
dBℓ
d pB
− τwωℓ
(
dAℓ
d pB
+
dBℓ
d pB
)
− pB dB
ℓ
d pB
−Bℓ
]
(3.70)
By inserting (3.70) into (3.69), dividing by UℓX , equating (dW/d pB)/U
ℓ
X to zero, and
solving for pB gives (3.28).
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Chapter 4
How to assess energy and climate
policies in transport
Joint work with Stephane Tchung-Ming
4.1 Introduction
Energy and environmental economists usually consider the transport’s sector contribution
to climate change as the major challenge for this sector. It has been argued that the sectoral
prevailing pattern of energy consumption needs to change (IEA, 2009; Schäfer, 2012),
but how this change has to be achieved seems less clear. Policy options oriented towards
improving vehicle fuel efficiency and introducing low-carbon fuels and advanced vehicle
technologies have traditionally been promoted as crucial to achieve ambitious emission
targets. Recently, changes in consumer behavior have also been advocated as a key factor
in reducing transport CO2 emissions (Anable et al., 2012; Daly et al., 2014; IEA, 2009).
The fear is that even a dramatic technological change does not suffice to meet strong carbon
reduction targets, at reasonable costs, in the absence of a considerable behavioral change.
On the transport economics side, the climate change issue has captured less attention
and efforts have mostly concentrated on reducing traffic congestion. Congestion pricing has
been almost obsessively advocated as the instrument to solve "all the world’s transportation
problems" (Arnott, 2015). There are at least two reasons for this. First, fuel-related
externalities generally account for a small fraction of the total external societal costs of
driving (Anas and Lindsey, 2011). Second, as the ultimate effect of congestion pricing
is to reduce transport activity, side benefits from reduced energy-related externalities are
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also associated to this policy (Anas and Lindsey, 2011; Proost et al., 2009; Proost and Van
Dender, 2001; Van Dender, 2009).
Both points of view are of course justified. However, given that climate change
externalities and congestion externalities are generated simultaneously, it is essential to
analyze them in an integrated framework instead of separately. First, both externalities are
of different nature and this imposes an extra challenge in the design of policy instruments to
address them. CO2 externalities, for instance, depend on the energy commodity (e.g. fuel,
electricity) and vehicle used, whereas congestion externalities depend on traffic volume on
a given infrastructure and period of time. Second, congestion exhibits feedback effects on
consumption (i.e. congestion discourages travel demand), whereas CO2 emissions do not.
Building a bridge between transport-energy modeling and transport economics is
essential in such a case. Each discipline has so much to learn from the other. The focus of
transport economics on travel demand management has resulted in well suited techniques
to simulate consumer’s responses to policy implementations. Those techniques can be
useful in the energy modeling field now that the need for introducing consumer behavior in
transport-energy models has become clear (e.g. Cayla and Maïzi, 2015; Daly et al., 2014;
Götz et al., 2012; Kok et al., 2011; Schäfer, 2012; Waisman et al., 2013). In the same
way, the technological detail and the complex energy substitution relationships, typical
of energy system models, can help to refine the analysis of energy issues in transport
economics where a single technology or an isolated system are usually studied.
In this chapter we propose an approach that allows the analysis of demand feedback
responses into a transport energy-system model, and more specifically a bottom-up TIMES-
based1 model: the MIRET2 model. Our approach differs from the traditional bottom-up
model in that we hard-link MIRET with a micro-economic representation of passenger
demand. The integrated model adds three main extensions to the traditional representation
of the transport sector in TIMES-based models. First, it defines the demand via a nested-
CES3 structure that simulates the consumer willingness to substitute one transport service
for another or transport services for other consumption goods. Thus, instead of managing
the demand through exogenous assumptions (and eventually with own-price elasticities),
the integrated model trades off interrelated demand choices endogenously and is able to
1TIMES, The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System, is a model generator developed by IEA-ETSAP.
2MIRET is a transport TIMES-based model whose scope is continental France. The model was developed
by IFPEN, a public-sector research and training center that covers the fields of energy, transport and the
environment.
3Nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution utility functions whose mathematical formulation dates back
to Keller (1976).
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account for demand feedback effects at the aggregate and modal levels. Second, it considers
the spatial (e.g. urban and rural) and temporal (e.g. peak and off-peak) dimensions of
transport demand. Therefore, the model is not only suitable for the analysis of policy
instruments that address the use of energy and technologies in the transport system (e.g.
fuel efficiency standards), but also instruments that address directly the demand for specific
transport services (e.g. urban congestion pricing). Finally, it considers travel time costs
per mode and congestion feedback effects for road modes. Taking into account time
costs not only ensures that attributes other than monetary costs are considered, but allows
introducing congestion externalities. This is important when examining side-effects of
policy instruments.
The use of the model for policy analysis is illustrated through the simulation of two
instruments, a carbon tax and a congestion charge, applied to the French case. The
carbon tax is intended to address CO2 emission externalities, whereas the congestion tax
is intended to address traffic congestion externalities. Given the different nature of these
instruments, the aim is not to compare them in terms of externality reduction but rather to
show the different margins of consumer behavior through which each instrument acts: a
CO2 tax guides the adoption of technology, whereas a congestion charge reallocates traffic
over time and infrastructures. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time that the
effect of policy instruments on traffic congestion are analyzed through a TIMES-based
model.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 surveys the studies that have introduced
consumer behavior in transport bottom-up models as well as the specifications used in
transport economics literature to describe transport demand. Section 4.3 describes our
integrated model from both the demand and the energy supply sides. Section 4.4 shows
graphically how the link between the two models operates for policy analysis and in
Section 4.5 a policy analysis is performed numerically. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Literature review
Two different modeling paradigms are widely recognized in energy system modeling:
the top-down and bottom-up approaches. In addition, there are the hybrid models that
bridge the two approaches. Whereas top-down models look at the energy system from a
macroeconomic perspective (usually, computable general equilibrium models), bottom-up
models describe the system in a process-oriented manner (technology explicit) from the
supply of primary energy to the final demand of energy services. Given their high level
82 How to assess energy and climate policies in transport
of technological detail, it is more difficult to include behavioral aspects in bottom-up
models (Götz et al., 2012; Kok et al., 2011). However, this approach remains widely used
to explore mitigation options in the transport sector (Kok et al., 2011), as technology is
expected to play a significant role in decarbonizing this sector.
General specifications that should be included in transport energy-system models to
simulate behavioral changes have been recently identified by Schäfer (2012). The main
specifications include: elasticity of demand, spatial segmentation of demand, endogenous
choice of modes, and account of infrastructure capacity to simulate traffic congestion
and endogenous change in travel speeds. Although these specifications are relatively new
in energy modeling, they are common in the transport economics field4. Our research
is therefore situated within the two intersecting theoretical frameworks. This section
first shows how consumer behavior has been addressed in transport bottom-up models.
Next, it gives an overview of relevant specifications used in transport economics to model
passenger transport demand.
4.2.1 Consumer behavior in the bottom-up approach
Various studies have tried to analyze behavioral issues in bottom-up models. Table 4.1
presents a (non-exhaustive) overview of this literature. Three main strategies can be
identified: the use of exogenous scenarios, the linkage with General Equilibrium Models
(GEM), and the use of internal specifications in the bottom-up structure.
These approaches fail however to take account of Shäfer’s (2012) specifications. In
what-if -scenarios analyses, behavioral changes are imposed exogenously. The aim of these
analyses is to assess the effects of given input changes on the model’s outputs. In linkages
between bottom-up and macro-economic models the focus is on feedback effects with the
rest of the economy. Issues other than the elasticity of the demand per mode are not taken
into account in these approaches.
Recent studies concentrate on improving the description of the transport sector into the
bottom-up structure (Cayla and Maïzi, 2015; Daly et al., 2014). Although these approaches
constitute important steps towards a better account of consumer behavior, the bottom-up
model itself might not suffice to fully simulate consumer behavior (see Kok et al., 2011).
4Transport engineering and urban transport planning also use these kinds of specifications in the so-called
four-step models (trip generation, trip distribution, mode share, route assignment). However, these disciplines
focus on forecasting transport demand, whereas transport economics focuses on the simulation of transport
demand for policy analysis.
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Table 4.1 Consumer behavior in transport bottom-up analyses
Study Model Behavioral specification
Schäfer and Jacoby (2005) MARKAL∗-
EPPA†
Soft-link with a GEM. Modal shares calibrated exoge-
nously.
IEA (2009) MoMo‡ Exogenous what-if scenarios. Elasticities for vehicle
travel (fuel price and income) and vehicle ownership
Anable et al. (2012) MARKAL∗-Ed Exogenous what-if scenarios. Own-price elasticity of
demands.
Daly et al. (2014) TIMES∗ Travel time costs per mode and a general travel time bud-
get constraint incorporated into the optimization setting.
Investments in public transport infrastructure reduce this
mode’s travel time
Cayla and Maïzi (2015) TIMES∗ Consumer heterogeneity introduced into the optimization
setting by differentiating (per consumer type) demands,
discount rates and equipment-investment constraints
∗MARKAL (MARket ALocation) and TIMES (The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System) are two bottom-
up model-generators developed by IEA-ETSAP. TIMES is the successor of MARKAL. MARKAL-Ed allows
for the own-price elasticity of the demand.
†EPPA (Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis) is a (world-scope) General Equilibrium Model (GEM)
developed by MIT.
‡MoMo (Mobility Model) is a transport spreadsheet model developed by IEA-ETP.
The approach proposed by Daly et al. (2014) is interesting because it uses one of the
major determinants of transport demand: travel time. It ignores, however, the essential
feedback effect between time costs and demand: in the presence of congestion, the average
time cost experienced by the traveler increases with the use of the infrastructure and this
discourages demand. In Daly et al.’s (2014) model, the introduction of time costs leads
to the use of only private cars (the fastest mode). The combination of time costs with
investments in public transport (which reduce public-transpor travel time) favors public
transport if its infrastructure costs are low, otherwise it favors the use of private cars. The
model overlooks the complexity of the travel time concept in transport networks. Moreover,
assuming car as the fastest mode may not always be appropriate. In dense urban areas, for
instance, congestion makes car trips longer and this in turn makes public transport more
attractive. This kind of effect can hardly be reproduced in this model.
Cayla and Maïzi (2015) succeed in simulating consumer heterogeneity and differenti-
ated transport demand, including its spatial dimension. The demand is disaggregated into
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120 categories considering: location, car ownership and socio-economic criteria, such as
occupation, size and income of the household.
To ensure a more refined representation of consumer behavior, this chapter instead
proposes an approach that hard-links a bottom-up model with a detailed transport demand
model. The approach takes into account Shäfer’s (2012) specifications, including the
feedback effect of traffic congestion on consumer behavior.
We now turn our attention to the representation of consumer preferences in transport
demand models.
4.2.2 Consumer behavior in transport demand models
The rationale behind economic models that simulate transport demand relies on the theory
of consumer choice. Travelers choose among alternatives so as to maximize their utility
subject to a budget constraint. The utility function expresses preferences over alternative
types of transport. The budget constraint represents the limited amount of both money
and time available to the traveler. Time is considered as an essential input for personal
transport and therefore plays an important role in the choice of transport options. It is also
essential in the definition of congestion externalities (characterized by feedback effects)
and in the analysis of policy measures that affect travel times (e.g. improvements that
allow travel time savings). The demand functions and indirect utility functions are derived
as functions of income and prices (monetary and time costs). Typical consumer surplus
measures apply.
Models at the aggregate and disaggregate levels exist. The disaggregate approach,
which relies mostly on discrete-choice models, is clearly superior because it depicts
individual decision making explicitly.5 However, this approach requires an extensive
amount of data. Aggregate level models, on the other hand, offer a good compromise
between performance and data. The representative consumer is the simplifying construct
that allows this analysis. The most popular representative consumer model is the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES), which combines a simple functional form with a convenient
parametrization of aggregate preference for variety. Anderson et al. (1992) show that the
CES model can represent a population of diverse individuals making discrete choices of
alternatives and continuous choices of quantities.6
5For a detailed explanation see Walker and Ben-Akiva 2011.
6The choice process underlying the CES demand function can be seen as consisting of two stages. First
the alternative is selected, then the quantity of the selected alternative is chosen.
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Nested CES-type utility functions have been commonly used to represent passenger
preferences in quantitative analyses of transport policy. De Borger and Proost (2001) and
Proost et al. (2002) use this approach to look into the transport pricing reform in Europe,
though at national levels. De Borger et al. (2004) use the same specification to study a
pricing reform in a small open economy and Proost and Sen (2006) use it in an economy
with two different government levels (urban and regional). Finally, Proost and Van Dender
(2001, 2008) and Kilani et al. (2014) use it to analyze the impacts of a pricing reform at
the urban level.7
The main advantage of the nested CES-type specification is that it requires a minimum
of data: modal shares and prices at the reference equilibrium and the elasticities of substi-
tution between the alternatives. It also allows to easily split the demand in differentiated
market segments and has proven to be well suited to include congestion externalities. In
other words, this specification ensures, with a minimum of data, Schäfer’s (2012) require-
ments to simulate behavioral changes in energy-system models. We use it to describe
consumers’ preferences in our transport demand module.
4.3 The model
The model’s components are described in Figure 4.1. The first component is the transport
demand module (right-hand side of Figure 4.1) that represents passenger decisions based
on the relative prices of transport services, and on passengers’ income and preferences.
The second component is the transport supply module (left-hand side of Figure 4.1) that
represents the optimal choice of technologies and other inputs such as fuels. In this module,
the full supply chain of energy services for transport is represented in a bottom-up manner.8
A number of different vehicle technologies is available. Transport demand and supply
interact through prices and quantities to reach the equilibrium in each period.
7This specification has also been used in cost-benefit analyses (see De Palma et al., 2007, 2008, 2010), e.g.
in the analysis of the use of road toll revenues in Switzerland, Germany and France (Cretegny et al., 2007;
Doll and Link, 2007; Raux et al., 2007); and the efficiency of the 30 priority projects of the Trans-European
transport networks–TEN-T (Proost et al., 2013).
8This includes the extraction and import of primary energy, its conversion to conventional and bio fuels,
the distribution of this final energy and its use in transport technologies such as cars, buses, etc.
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Figure. 4.1 The integrated model
Each period, households maximize utility based on the generalized cost (Cgeni ) of
transport demand (Qi). (For illustrative purposes we use the subscript i here, but specific
subscripts will be defined in Section 4.3.1.) The generalized cost of transport is the sum
of monetary and time costs. Monetary costs are composed of the resource costs (Cresi )
and of (eventually) congestion charges (τci ). Resource costs are derived from the supply
module and depend on energy (Ei) and technology (Ti) constraints in the energy system
(e.g. availability of fuels, technological progress), on energy taxes (τei ), and on the level
of the demand. The endogeneity of the demand is ensured through the feedback from
the demand module. Time costs (Ctimei ) can depend on the volume of traffic on each
infrastructure.
The demand module is static whereas the supply model is dynamic with perfect
foresight. This means that whereas travel decisions are made in the short run (period after
period), the investment decisions are made in each period with full knowledge of future
events. This can be seen as a strong assumption but is not that unrealistic once one realizes
that user travel decisions (about, for instance, which mode to use or whether to travel or
not) are made in the short run, whereas investments (e.g. buying a car) involve a kind of
long-term planning.
An iterative procedure is applied to obtain the equilibrium in each period. The equi-
librium condition ensures that quantities demanded equal their supply. We return to
the linkage of both models in Section 4.3.3, we initially focus on describing the main
characteristics of the demand and the supply modules (Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2).
4.3.1 Transport demand
Our passenger travel demand model is largely based on a consistent microeconomic
demand formulation used in previous literature (De Borger et al., 1996, 1997; De Borger
and Proost, 2001; Proost et al., 2002). Consumer demand is modeled as a nested CES
function whose structure is shown in Figure 4.2.
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Aggregate household consumption is divided between transport and other consumption
goods. Transport demand is an aggregate of country transport activities made up of two
components: commuting and leisure trips, R = {CM,LS}. Trip distances are fixed by
assuming fixed locations for all activities. Two types of zones are represented: urban and
non-urban, Z = {UR,NU} and four different infrastructures: metropolitan and suburban
infrastructures for urban zones, and short-distance (e.g. secondary roads) and long-distance
(e.g. motorways) infrastructures for non-urban zones, I = {ME,SU,SD,LD}. (Two subsets
of infrastructures are defined: IUR = {ME,SU} and INU = {SD,LD}.) Finally, two
periods of the day are considered: peak and off-peak, P = {PK,OP}.
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Figure. 4.2 Nested demand structure
For each branch in Figure 4.2, all modes of passenger transport are represented (see
Figure 4.3), M = {car,bus,metro,urban train, train,H.S.T, plane}, with subsets MUR =
{car,bus,metro,urban train} for urban modes, and MNU = {car,bus, train,H.S.T., plane}
for non-urban modes.
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Figure. 4.3 Modal specification
The substitutability between the modes depends on the reason and the location of the
trips and on the period of the day (e.g. modes are more substitutable in metropolitan areas
in off-peak periods). This is managed through the elasticity of substitution between each
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pair of branches of the complete tree (Table 4.5 in 4.A shows the resulting own-price
elasticities for the base year at the reference case).
Households choose how much to travel for a given reason R, on which infrastructure
I, by which mode M, and at what period of the day P. Decisions are taken every year (or
period of years) Y . Vehicle-kilometers traveled are denoted by QRIMPY .
Travel time costs
Two time components are considered: in-vehicle time and waiting time. In-vehicle times
for road (bus and car) and non-road (rail and air) modes differ in that, for road modes, they
include time lost in congestion. Waiting time is only considered for urban public transport
modes. Conversion to monetary costs is done by using estimates of monetary valuations of
travel time savings (time in hours multiplied by the value of time in e/h). The value of
time varies across trip purposes, period of the day and modes.
To introduce road traffic congestion, we use the time-averaged speed-flow function
used in the standard economic analysis of congestion (see Small and Verhoef 2007). This
function relates average speed over a given period to the average vehicle inflow over the
period. Each infrastructure I is seen as a hypothetical one link system with homogeneous
traffic conditions. Modes that use road infrastructures, MRO = {car,bus}, interact via the
congestion function. The well-known Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) curve9 is used
tIPY (QIPY ) = tffIY
(
1+α (QIPY/KIY )β
)
QIPY = ∑
R,
M∈MRO
φMQRIMPY .
(4.1)
Time needed to drive 1 Km on infrastructure I at period P and year Y (tIPY ), depends
on the volume of traffic in that infrastructure at that period (QIPY ). The congestion function
is the same for cars and buses. To capture the fact that buses contribute more to congestion
(per vehicle), the demand is multiplied by a constant factor φM that is higher for buses.10
The travel time of buses is therefore a fixed proportion of the travel time of cars. The free-
flow travel time (tffIY ) and the infrastructure capacity (KIY ) are determined by calibration
given observed average speeds and flows per infrastructure.
9The BPR function has been widely used in transportation planning with parameter values α = 0.15 and
β = 4 (see Small and Verhoef, 2007).
10Similar assumptions are used in De Borger et al. (1997); De Borger and Proost (2001); Proost and Van
Dender (2001)
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Multiplying the time function (4.1) by the number of trips and the value of time
(VOTRMPY ) gives total travel time costs
TCtimeIPY = tIPY (QIPY ) ∑
R,
M∈MRO
QRIMPY VOTRMPY . (4.2)
Marginal external congestion costs, defined as the additional time loss imposed by one
extra vehicle-km on other users of the infrastructure, can be calculated from this expression.
By deriving (4.2) with respect to QIPY and subtracting the marginal cost that the extra
vehicle already pays (the extra vehicle also experiences the increase in travel time), we get
an expression for the marginal external congestion costs
MECCIPY = tffIY
αβ
KIY
(
QIPY
KIY
)β−1
∑
R,
M∈MRO
QRIMPY VOTRMPY . (4.3)
Two other time components are still to be defined: in-vehicle time for non-road modes
and waiting time for urban public transport modes. Both components are introduced in a
very simple way.
In-vehicle time for non-road modes, is the average journey time of scheduled services.
Consistent with the literature (De Borger et al., 1997; De Borger and Proost, 2001), it
varies by mode and infrastructure.
Waiting time for urban public transport modes is a fixed component that varies per
mode, time of the day and infrastructure. It captures differences in availability of transport
services across infrastructures (metropolitan and suburban) and periods of the day for the
different modes (bus, urban train and metro). In the literature, this component is usually
introduced with the Mohring effect whereby waiting costs decline with the increase of the
demand (Mohring, 1972). Assuming that they are fixed allows us to drastically simplify
the link between the models and can be justified when the variation in the demand volume
is low. However, a more comprehensive analysis would include this effect.
4.3.2 Transport supply
MIRET—the energy-transport supply model used in this analysis—was developed by
IFPEN using the TIMES model generator. Before moving to the description of MIRET (in
Section 4.3.2), we present a brief overview of the TIMES model based on Loulou et al.
(2005) where further details can be obtained.
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The TIMES model generator
TIMES builds on a bottom-up technology rich optimization framework,11 which allows
a detailed representation of regional or multi-regional energy systems, ranging from
sectoral to global representations. It enables to describe stocks of equipments and physical
flows across technologies from the extraction of primary energy resources to the final
consumption of energy.
This model generator allows developing a wide variety of energy models all sharing
common structural features. The main inputs provided by the modeler are:
• The demands,12 which can be either end-use (e.g. car road travel, residential lighting)
or energy service (e.g. directly the demand for electricity) demands.
• The existing stocks of equipments for energy demand and supply (e.g. existing vehi-
cles, installed capacity of power plants), their economic and technical characteristics
(investment and operation costs, efficiencies) and the characteristics of possible
future technologies.
• The present and future sources of primary energy supply (production and imports),
their potentials, and their extraction costs or import prices.
• Environmental or policy constraints (e.g. GHG limits, energy taxes).
TIMES finds the optimal solution to satisfy the demands over the time horizon. This
solution represents simultaneous decisions on equipment investment and operation, primary
energy supply and energy commodities trade. The model internally builds the inverse
production function for each energy demand. This is a stepwise constant function13 in
which each horizontal step reflects the costs associated to the production of the service by a
certain set of energy carriers and technologies (e.g. gasoline cars). If the quantity produced
increases and if one or more resources in the mix are exhausted (e.g. fuel availability),
the system starts using a different set of technologies, though at higher cost. Each change
in the production mix generates therefore one step of the staircase function with a value
higher than the preceding step.
11The existence of this framework traces back to at least Fishbone and Abilock (1981), who consolidated
an early research effort into a generic framework called MARKAL.
12The demand can be defined in an inelastic or price-elastic form. Yet, introducing cross-elasticities is so
far not allowed in this framework.
13In Linear Programming the shadow price of a constraint remains constant over a certain interval until the
point where it changes abruptly, giving rise to a stepwise constant functional shape (see Loulou et al., 2005).
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The MIRET model
As a TIMES incarnation, MIRET is built as a long-term (time horizon 2050, with 2007 as
base year), dynamic, techno-economic model that covers the French energy and transport
system in detail. It has been used in national case studies (ANCRE, 2013; Kanudia et al.,
2015; Menten et al., 2015; Nicolas et al., 2014). This section is based on Nicolas et al.
(2014) where the model’s structure and assumptions are described in detail. We limit our
description to the main blocks composing the Reference Energy System.
• Primary-energy-supply block: it includes imported fossil energy (oil, coal, gas) and
biomass (agricultural and wood).
• Energy-technology block: it includes technologies for energy conversion and end-use
transport services. Technologies for energy conversion include oil refining,14 bio-fuel
units,15 preparation of fuels for transport at blending,16 and a simple representation of
the electricity sector. End-use technologies for passenger are distinguished between
road and non-road modes, whereas for freight only road modes are considered.
Road modes for passenger transport include personal vehicles (conventional and
light-conventional, hybrid, plug-in hybrid and gasoline, diesel, natural gas, flex-
fuel, battery electric cars) and buses (conventional, hybrid and gasoline, diesel and
biodiesel). Non-road modes are basically rail options used at the urban and non-
urban levels (metro, train and H.S.T.). Freight transport is covered by trucks with a
similar representation of that for buses.
• Final-energy-demand block: it is divided into end-use demands and energy service
demands. End-use demands are divided into passenger urban (car, bus, metro, train)
and non-urban (car, bus, train, H.S.T.) demands, and light utility vehicles (LUV)
and freight demands. Energy service demands are used for air transport (given the
complexity to represent explicit technologies for this sector), electricity demands
and exported products (oil products, electricity). Common to all these transport
demands is that they are inelastic and exogenously specified.
• Policy block: it includes measures and constraints of several types. Most are of
microscopic nature, such as quality norms for refinery products.
14With a detailed process-based model derived from the IFPEN OURSE model, see Saint-Antonin (1998)
and Tehrani (2008) for detailed presentations and Nicolas et al. (2014) for an analysis within MIRET.
15Including first and second generation biofuel production units and biogas.
16This includes diesel, bio-diesel B30, gasoline grades E5, E10 and E85, and jet fuel including fossil and
bio bases.
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4.3.3 Linkage
To simplify notation we retake the subscript i, used at the beginning of this section, and
concentrate only on one transport service at a given period P and year Y . We illustrate the
case with no taxes (the effect of a tax in the demand and the supply sides are shown in
Section 4.4).
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Energy market equilibrium
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Transport market equilibrium
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Figure. 4.4 No-tax equilibrium for the transport service i
One iteration, of the procedure that links both models, can be summarized as follows.
The equilibrium in the energy market is obtained at the intersection of the resource cost
and demand curves (left-hand side of Figure 4.4). The resource cost curve is stepwise
whereas the demand curve is inelastic and exogenously specified (Section 4.3.2). The
resulting resource cost Cresi is sent to the demand model and along with the time costs
Ctimei (endogenous to the demand model, Section 4.3.1) they determine the generalized
cost of the transport service Cgeni (see Figure 4.1 for more detail). The intersection between
the generalized cost and the demand curves (right-hand side of Figure 4.4) determines the
equilibrium in the transport market side. The resulting demand Qi is sent back to MIRET
and if it has changed a new iteration is performed until both models converge.
This is of course the equilibrium for one transport service. The entire equilibrium is a
multi-dimensional analog of the above equilibrium where substitutions at both the demand
and the supply sides occur.
Note that what is exogenous to MIRET is the demand and this is the output of the
demand model (demand curve on the right-hand side of Figure 4.4). Similarly, what is
exogenous to the demand model is the resource cost and this is the output of MIRET
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(resource cost curve on the left-hand side of Figure 4.4). This means that both the transport
demand and its resource cost are endogenized in the integrated model. Therefore, this
approach not only extends the TIMES-based approach (by introducing an elastic demand
curve), but also the typical transport economic model in which the resource cost of transport
is usually exogenously specified and assumed to be fixed.17
4.3.4 Social welfare
The change in social welfare (∆W ), given a policy reform, is the sum of three components
(all in monetary terms): change in consumer surplus (∆CS), change in tax revenues (∆T R)
and change in CO2 emissions (∆CO2)
∆W = ∆CS+MCPF ·∆T R−VCO2 ·∆CO2. (4.4)
Consumer surplus is computed by the demand model and it is measured as the equiv-
alent variation from a reference case (in monetary terms). Extra-tax revenues (due to a
wider revenue base) are considered to increase social welfare. They are multiplied by
the marginal costs of public funds (MCPF) as every euro raised from taxes has a cost
in terms of the distortion it creates in the economy. Generally, when distortions in the
rest of the economy are not considered, the MCPF equals 1. If on the contrary, it is
assumed that externality-tax revenues are used to reduce other distortionary taxes (e.g.
labor taxes), the MCPF can be slightly higher than 1. This reflects a sort of premium for
every dollar transferred from consumer surplus to tax revenue (Proost and Van Dender,
2001). Reductions of CO2 emissions are also considered as welfare improving. They are
converted in monetary terms by using the social value of CO2 emissions (VCO2).
Note that congestion externalities are not included in the welfare function. This is
because their effect is accounted for in the consumer surplus measure as congestion is a
feedback externality. Clearly, reduced congestion lowers the time cost of transport and
this increases consumer surplus. CO2 emissions, on the other hand, do not exhibit this
feedback effect and, therefore, need to be included in the welfare function.
17See for instance De Borger and Proost (2001); Kilani et al. (2014); Proost and Van Dender (2001);
Proost et al. (2002).
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4.4 Use of the model for policy analysis: a graphical illus-
tration
It is instructive to start by a simple graphical example of the use of the integrated model for
policy analysis before moving to the numerical illustration in next section. We analyze the
effects of a congestion charge and an energy tax taking as reference point the equilibrium
in Figure 4.4.
First, consider imposing a veh-km charge (τcongi ) on the transport service i at period
P and year Y . The market effects can be summarized as a succession of three moves
(Figure 4.5) repeated in every iteration of the linkage.
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Figure. 4.5 Equilibrium for the transport service i with a congestion tax
Imposing τcongi raises the generalized cost of the transport service. The generalized
cost curve therefore shifts up by the distance τcongi (move 1 in Figure 4.5) and a new
equilibrium, determined by Q′i and C
gen′
i , is obtained. In this new equilibrium the demand
Q′i is lower than the initial demand Qi (move 2 in Figure 4.5). Note that this decrease of
the demand reduces the time cost Ctime
′
i compared to the initial equilibrium (Figure 4.4).
Next, Q′i is sent to the supply model (move 3 in Figure 4.5). The reduction of the demand
determines a new equilibrium in the supply model (the pair (Q′i,Cres
′
i )) and (eventually)
reduces the resource costs Cres
′
i (case illustrated in Figure 4.5). Whether the resource cost
is reduced or not depends on the length of the horizontal step of the production function
which in turn depends on constraints in the energy system (see Section 4.3.2). Next, Cres
′
i
is sent back to the demand model to start a new iteration. The iterations are repeated until
both models converge.
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Now assume an energy tax (τei ) imposed on energy commodities used to produce the
transport service i at period P and year Y . This can be, for instance, a tax on the carbon
content of motor fuels. We assume that the tax affects the production cost of the sets
of energy carries and technologies that compose the three first steps of the production
function (e.g. technologies that use fossil fuels). The other steps can represent energy
carries and technologies that are not affected by the tax (e.g. electric cars). The effects on
the system are again summarized as a succession of three moves (Figure 4.6).
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Figure. 4.6 Equilibrium for the transport service i with an energy tax
Imposing τei shifts up the resource cost curve (move 1 in Figure 4.6). The new resource
cost Cres
′
i (that includes the energy tax) is sent to the demand model. The generalized
cost curve shifts up (move 2 in Figure 4.6) and a new equilibrium, determined by Q′i
and Cgen
′
i , is obtained. Again, the demand Q
′
i is lower than the initial demand Qi (move
3 in Figure 4.5) and the time cost Ctime
′
i is reduced compared to the initial equilibrium
(Figure 4.4). The new Q′i is sent back to the supply model to start a new iteration. The
iterations are repeated until both models converge.
4.5 Use of the model for policy analysis: a numerical il-
lustration
This section illustrates, with French data (see Appendix 4.A), the use of the model for
policy analysis. We study the welfare and modal change effects of a congestion charge
and a tax on CO2 emissions, both implemented from 2021 onwards. The effects of these
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policy instruments are systematically compared to results from a Base Case (BC) where
no instrument is used. Given the different nature of the instruments, the purpose of this
exercise is not to compare their performance in terms of externality reduction but rather to
compare the channels through which each instrument works in the integrated model. This
exercise also illustrates the use of the integrated model for the analysis of different types
of instruments: a transport policy (the congestion charge) and an energy policy (the carbon
tax).
The congestion charge is basically a zonal pricing scheme on the infrastructure and
the period of time when congestion is most severe, i.e. metropolitan areas at peak periods.
Cars pay a veh-km charge equal to the marginal external congestion cost (MECC), as
described in Equation (4.3).
The energy tax, on the other hand, is a tax related to the CO2 content of fuels used in
the transport sector. The value of the tax is taken from Quinet (2009) and corresponds to
the shadow price used by the French government to evaluate public projects and policy
instruments. It starts from 56 e/tCO2 in 2021 and increases linearly18 to reach 350 e/tCO2
in 2050. According to Quinet (2009), the relatively high level of the tax reflects the
ambitious nature of EU emission goals. Note however that when only CO2 emissions are
taken into account, a CO2 tax is equivalent to a fuel tax, and according to Proost et al.
(2009), current European fuel taxes reflect a carbon tax of around 200 to 300 e/tCO2. This
evidence, therefore, implies that the CO2 tax analyzed here is much lower than current
European fuel taxes.
The carbon tax per ton of CO2 is translated by MIRET into a CO2 charge per km. The
equivalent CO2 charge per km, therefore, varies according to the carbon content of the fuel
(e.g. diesel, gasoline) and the vehicle fuel efficiency (e.g. large or small vehicles which
differ in their fuel efficiency). It is worth noting at this point that in real circumstances
vehicle fuel efficiency (l/km) ultimately depends on travel speeds (km/h).19 At low speeds
fuel consumption per km is high. As speed increases fuel consumption per km falls, to
raise again at high speeds. In MIRET, however, speed regimes are fixed per zone, so
that fuel efficiency only differs between urban and non-urban uses of the vehicle,20 and
therefore the CO2 charge also varies between the two zones (i.e. a vehicle pays a higher
18A linear growth is chosen for the sake of simplicity.
19Data on the relationship between speed and fuel economy can be found in Davis et al. (2014).
20This means that in the energy supply side speeds are assumed to be fixed per zone whereas they can vary
in the demand side. Linking speeds of both models would be interesting because this would allow extending
the analysis to the effects of reducing congestion on energy consumption. Unfortunately, doing so seems
extremely hard at this state of the linkage.
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CO2 tax per km when it is used in urban areas given the higher fuel consumption per km
in these areas).
Note that the nature of the two instruments is different. Whereas the congestion charge
is a first-best instrument to address congestion externalities, the CO2 tax is a first-best
instrument to address fuel related externalities, which in this case correspond to CO2
emissions.21 The congestion charge penalizes the use of the vehicle at given infrastructures
and periods of the day (regardless the type of vehicle and fuel used), whereas the CO2 tax
penalizes the use of certain fuels and technologies (regardless the infrastructure where and
period of the day when the vehicle is used). Another important difference between the
instruments is that the fuel tax is imposed over the entire transport system whereas the
congestion charge is only imposed on a targeted mode and infrastructure (i.e. car use in
metropolitan areas).
In what follows, and after a brief inspection of results obtained from MIRET and the
integrated model (Section 4.5.1), we compare results from the two instruments. We start by
clarifying how the two policies affect travel costs (Section 4.5.2), and move on to discuss
the aggregate effects on demand and on both externalities (Section 4.5.3), to finish with
the effects on modal changes (Section 4.5.4) and welfare (Section 4.5.5).
4.5.1 Difference between using MIRET and the integrated model
To compare the behavior of MIRET and the integrated model, we compare results from
simulating the CO2 tax, described above, in both versions of the model (MIRET and
MIRET linked with the demand model).
Table 4.2 CO2 reductions from a carbon tax simulated with MIRET and
with the integrated model [%]
Difference with BC 2021 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
MIRET -0.49 -0.64 -0.85 -2.68 -16.01 -19.16 -7.45
MIRET + Demand model -0.74 -1.33 -1.69 -3.76 -16.66 -19.76 -8.49
Table 4.2 shows the reduction of CO2 emissions (compared with the Base Case) result-
ing from simulating the same CO2 tax with both models. Reductions of CO2 emissions
21If local pollutants were also taken into account, the fuel tax would no longer be a first-best instrument
because these pollutants not only depend on fuel characteristics but also on vehicle characteristics, such as
maintenance. Fullerton and West (2002) show that, with homogeneous consumers and in the presence of
pollution externalities, a fuel tax or a veh-km charge can achieve the first-best result if they both depend on
vehicle characteristics. Such taxes would be, of course, difficult to implement.
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are slightly higher with the integrated model. This follows from the fact that, in MIRET,
transport demands are inelastic and supplied regardless the increase of transport prices
resulting from the CO2 tax. Therefore, the only possible effect of higher prices is a change
in the use of technologies. In the integrated model, instead, the increase of transport
prices not only results in a change in the use of technologies but also in different modal
substitutions and in a reduction of the transport activity (this will be shown in detail in
Sections 4.5.3 and 4.5.4). This enables a higher reduction of CO2 emissions with the same
level of the tax.
Although the difference between results from both models might seem modest, it is
important to bear in mind that the tax per ton of CO2 analyzed in this simulations results
in a low charge per km once fuel efficiency is accounted for (see the following section)
and it is the charge per km that ultimately determines the reaction of the demand. A more
important reaction of the demand side, when using the integrated model, can be expected
from a higher value of the CO2 tax.
Having shown the difference between the conventional bottom-up model (MIRET) and
the linked version proposed in this chapter, we turn now to the comparison of the policy
instruments, i.e. the congestion charge and the CO2 tax, using the integrated model. The
exercise shows how the integrated model can be used for policy analysis.
4.5.2 Effects on the cost of transport services
Starting by analyzing the effects of both instruments on costs may help to understand
further effects. The resulting charges per km are reported in the first block of rows in
Table 4.3. Two main differences between these charges can be identified. First, the
resulting congestion charge per km is considerably higher than the resulting CO2 charge
per km. The low CO2 charge results from translating the per-ton-of-CO2 tax into a tax
on CO2 emitted per km. This is computed by MIRET using current and expected vehicle
fuel efficiencies. The effect is exacerbated with technological progress. For instance, from
2035 onwards more fuel efficient cars start operating in urban areas, so the share of the
fuel cost component of using the vehicle decreases. This results in a lower charge per km,
despite a higher CO2 tax (per ton of CO2). The same happens with buses from the year
2040 onwards. Improved fuel efficiency compensates the increased CO2 tax, and as we
will show in Section 4.5.4, this has an important effect on modal choice. Second, note that
this happens only in urban areas. In non-urban areas the CO2 charge increases over the
whole horizon. This is because main improvements in vehicle fuel efficiency are expected
for low-speed regimes typical of driving conditions in urban areas.
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To compare the effects of the instruments on the cost components, we take the year
2035 as an example.22 Figure 4.7 shows the cost components of car commuting trips in
metropolitan areas at peak periods for the three scenarios: Base case (BC), Congestion
charge (Toll), and CO2 tax (CO2). Both, social and private costs are displayed (superscripts
S and P, respectively).
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Figure. 4.7 Cost components of car commuting trips in metropolitan areas at peak periods
First note that, for the Base-case and the CO2-tax scenarios, every passenger-kilometer
(pkm) traveled has a larger social cost (Cres+Ctime+MECC) than the private cost each
user pays (Cres+Ctime+Tax). In the case of the congestion-charge scenario, the social cost
equals the private cost, given that the tax exactly equals the MECC each pkm generates. The
increase in the private cost (generalized cost) implied by the congestion charge is followed
by a reduction of the demand and in turn by a reduction of both the time cost (7¢e/pkm23)
and the MECC (26¢e/pkm). Note that congestion is not completely eliminated, but its
cost is internalized. In the case of the CO2 tax, the small net rise of the private cost per km
makes almost no change on the time cost (0.8¢e/pkm) and the reduction of the MECC is
very limited (3¢e/pkm). This provides an overview of the limitation of a carbon (fuel) tax
to address congestion externalities.
22This is the year with the larger CO2 charge for urban areas, so policy effects may be easier to compare.
23This corresponds to an increase of the speed of 6.3 km/h (see Table 4.3).
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4.5.3 Aggregate effects
The fact that the congestion charge is higher than the CO2 charge translates into a (slightly)
higher reduction of the demand with this instrument, and this occurs at the aggregate as
well as at the zone levels (second block of rows in Table 4.3).
Table 4.3 General effects
Difference with BC 2021 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Equivalent charge [e/pkm]
Peak congestion charge:
Car in metropolitan areas 0.3351 0.3449 0.3522 0.3615 0.3716 0.3828 0.3866
CO2 tax∗:
Car in urban areas 0.0056 0.0137 0.0170 0.0231 0.0110 0.0041 0.0044
Car in non-urban areas 0.0021 0.0067 0.0076 0.0118 0.0104 0.0148 0.0221
Bus in urban areas 0.0033 0.0038 0.0024 0.0082 0.0106 0.0081 0.0030
Bus in non-urban areas 0.0015 0.0023 0.0034 0.0044 0.0068 0.0081 0.0075
Change in demand [%]
At the aggregate level:
Congestion charge -2.63 -2.61 -2.66 -2.68 -2.70 -2.74 -2.77
CO2 tax -0.31 -0.79 -0.93 -1.35 -1.00 -1.08 -1.45
At the urban level:
Congestion charge -1.55 -1.51 -1.53 -1.50 -1.49 -1.50 -1.48
CO2 tax -0.32 -0.76 -0.88 -1.31 -0.99 -1.02 -1.31
At the non-urban level:
Congestion charge -3.14 -3.13 -3.19 -3.25 -3.28 -3.33 -3.39
CO2 tax -0.31 -0.80 -0.95 -1.36 -1.00 -1.11 -1.52
Change in total CO2 emissions [%]
Congestion charge -2.06 -2.11 -2.23 -2.79 -2.77 -2.21 -1.89
CO2 tax -0.74 -1.33 -1.69 -3.76 -16.66 -19.76 -8.49
Change in MECCME,PK† [%]
Congestion charge -41.67 -41.34 -41.78 -41.88 -41.88 -41.74 -42.74
CO2 tax -1.14 -2.94 -3.50 -4.84 -3.11 -3.01 -4.21
Car speed (ME,PK)† [km/h]
Base case 29.0 28.7 28.3 28.0 27.6 27.3 26.9
Congestion charge 35.3 34.9 34.6 34.3 34.0 33.6 33.4
CO2 tax 29.1 29.0 28.8 28.6 28.0 27.6 27.4
∗The CO2 charge varies per vehicle-type, the value displayed here is the resulting increase of the
marginal resource cost of car and bus use at the equilibrium (see Figure 4.6).
†For comparison, we report changes of marginal external congestion costs and speeds only in
metropolitan areas at peak periods.
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Although congestion pricing is only implemented in metropolitan areas, part of the
increase of the generalized price of car use in these areas is compensated by the reduction
of non-urban demand. Higher transport prices reduce disposable income so that consumers
reduce the consumption of both kinds of trips. The reduction is more important at the
non-urban level given that the demand for this zone consists mainly of leisure trips, which
are more elastic than commuting trips (see Table 4.5 in Appendix 4.A). We return to this
in Section 4.5.4, where we analyze modal changes. First we have a look at the aggregate
effects of both policies on both externalities.
As expected, the CO2 tax is more efficient in reducing CO2 emissions, and the conges-
tion charge in reducing congestion at the targeted infrastructure (third block of rows in
Table 4.3). Yet, positive side effects can also be identified. The congestion charge succeeds
in slightly reducing total CO2 emissions, and similarly, the CO2 tax succeeds in slightly
reducing congestion. However, these side effects remain marginal.24
The CO2 tax gives incentives for the adoption of more fuel efficient technologies
whereas the congestion charge does not distinguish among technologies. Of course, in
real congestion pricing applications the instrument can be designed so as to roughly
differentiate technologies by implementing toll exemptions for cleaner vehicles,25 but
this type of instrument remains limited to consider the environmental characteristics of
a vehicle. Although we do not consider the case of a rough differentiation for cleaner
vehicles, the model can be easily adapted to simulate such a policy.
4.5.4 Modal change effects
The reduction of the demand for transport comes with modal changes in all the areas. In
what follows, we first analyze these modal changes at the urban and the metropolitan level,
and next at the non-urban level.
Urban areas
In urban areas, both the congestion charge and the CO2 tax induce a reduction of private
car use and an increase of public transport use (Figure 4.8). Given that the congestion
charge is much higher, its effect is stronger in both the reduction of car use and the increase
24Marginal positive side effects are also reported by Proost and Van Dender (2001) in the analysis of a
fuel tax and a cordon pricing policy with a transport demand model.
25Such as the Greener Vehicle Discount (GVD) or the Electrically Propelled Vehicle (EVD) in London.
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of public transport use. For the case of the CO2 tax, buses are less preferred among other
public transport modes because their CO2 emissions are also taxed.
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Figure. 4.8 Modal change in urban areas
Note that the modal change induced by the CO2 tax is reversed from the year 2035
onwards, when the use of the car starts increasing and the use of public transport modes
starts decreasing. This can be seen as a rebound effect. The volume of car use starts
increasing due to the decrease in the fuel cost (compared to previous years) resulting from
more fuel efficient vehicles (direct effect) and this reduces the use of public transport
(indirect effect). When the transport activity is priced below marginal social costs (as it is
the case in this illustration), this increase in volume is not beneficial (Proost et al., 2009).
Results, so far, have shown the efficiency of the CO2 tax in reducing CO2 emissions
through the adoption of new technology, but less in reducing car use. A high and increasing
carbon tax (per ton of CO2) is not a guarantee of a reduction of traffic volume when
vehicle fuel efficiency is expected to improve. Similarly, the effect on CO2 emissions of
a congestion tax that does not differentiate among technologies will be moderate. These
results are in line with Anas et al. (2009) who show that a congestion toll is more efficient
in reducing traffic congestion and a fuel tax is better in reducing fuel consumption and
CO2 emissions.
Metropolitan areas
At this point, a more detailed examination of the effects in urban areas is useful to
understand the mechanisms through which each instrument works. For this purpose, we
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separate the demand at the metropolitan level into the basic components: commuting and
leisure trips in peak and off-peak periods (Figure 4.9).
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Figure. 4.9 Modal change at the metropolitan level for commuting (top) and leisure
(bottom) trips, differentiated by peak (solid lines) and off-peak (dashed lines) periods
The left panel of Figure 4.9 shows that the main effect of the congestion charge26 on
commuting trips is to move them from car to public transport in peak periods, whereas the
effect on leisure trips is to move them from the peak to the off-peak period. This is because
commuting trips are less elastic than leisure trips. And of course, when the demand is
more elastic it is easier to move it to the off-peak period. For comparison, when analyzing
optimal time-of-day fares for public transport, Basso and Silva (2014) find that, to reduce
road congestion, it is more efficient to move people out of cars into public transport in
peak periods than to attract them to the off-peak periods.
On the other hand, the right panel of Figure 4.9 shows that the effect of the CO2 tax
operates in the same direction in both peak and off-peak periods. For commuting trips the
effect is a modal change from car to public transport, whereas for leisure trips the effect is
26Remember that the congestion charge is imposed only in peak periods.
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a reduction of the demand for all the modes. The reason is that the CO2 tax is the same for
peak and off-peak periods. Although the effects go in the same direction in both periods,
they seem to be more pronounced in off-peak periods. Again, this depends on the elasticity
of each segment of the demand.
These results show that both instruments induce modal changes in the expected direc-
tion, from car to public transport, but that they work on different margins of consumer
behavior. The congestion tax works mainly through reallocating trips over place and
time, whereas the CO2 tax through reducing the demand for those trips that can be easily
eliminated (such as leisure trips).
Non-urban areas
Finally, we analyze the effects of both instruments on non-urban areas (Figure 4.10).
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Figure. 4.10 Modal change in non-urban areas
Although the congestion charge is only implemented in metropolitan areas, it induces
a reduction of the demand on non-urban areas (left panel of Figure 4.10). This reduction is
due to an income effect: more expensive urban trips reduce consumers’ income so that a
change in the consumption of other transport services can also be expected. However, note
that this reduction comes without any modal effect. This is because prices at the non-urban
level remain unchanged, so that no substitution effects are induced.
On the other hand, as the CO2 tax is also imposed on non-urban demand, it induces a
modal change in these areas, from car and bus to rail and now also to plane (right panel
of Figure 4.10). The demand for air transport increases as the equivalent CO2 tax per km
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imposed on this demand is very low given the simple representation of this subsector in
MIRET (air transport is represented as a direct demand for energy, see Section 4.3.2).
A more detailed representation of this subsector would, of course, allow a more refined
analysis, not only in terms of modal change but also in terms of CO2 reductions.
4.5.5 Welfare effects
Finally, we show the effects of each policy instrument on social welfare, calculated
following Equation 4.4.27 Despite a reduction of consumer surplus, both policies yield
welfare gains after accounting for tax revenues and CO2 reductions (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4 Welfare changes with respect to the Base case [million e]
Welfare components 2021 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Congestion charge
Consumer surplus -2 938 -3 104 -3 206 -3 452 -3 611 -3 546 -3 997
Tax revenues 34 148 36 125 38 101 40 278 42 644 45 343 47 201
CO2 emissions reduction 127 203 323 542 680 648 566
Social welfare 31 337 33 224 35 218 37 368 39 713 42 445 43 770
CO2 tax
Consumer surplus -248 -685 -823 -1 248 -927 -1 029 -1 473
Tax revenues 2 843 7 537 9 108 13 765 10 329 11 433 16 237
CO2 emissions reduction 46 128 245 730 4 087 5 782 2 539
Social welfare 2 641 6 981 8 530 13 248 13 489 16 185 17 303
Total welfare gains from congestion pricing are larger than those from the CO2 tax.
This is basically because the congestion charge generates a larger amount of tax revenues
(given the higher level of the charge). Note however that the reduction of consumer surplus
is more important with this charge. This means that the reduction of congestion does not
compensate the negative effect of the tax. This result differs to some extent to that from
Proost and Van Dender (2001) who report a positive consumer surplus of an urban cordon
pricing policy. It can nevertheless be argued that when only urban demand is considered (as
it is the case in Proost and Van Dender, 2001), the income effect on non-urban demand28
identified in Section 4.5.4 can be neglected. One possible implication of this effect is that
it reduces consumer surplus.
27With MCPF = 1 and VCO2 equal to the tax on CO2 emissions per ton. Tax revenues from the carbon tax
are calculated with the value of the CO2 charge per km (Table 4.3).
28That is, the reduction of purchasing power generated by the urban congestion charge induces a reduction
of non-urban trips.
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These results should however be interpreted with care. Equal weights have been given
to all welfare components, but the government could, for instance, put a larger weight on
the reduction of CO2 emissions. This type of consideration can considerably change total
welfare effects.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has proposed a modeling tool for the analysis of transport policy and energy
policy in transport. The proposed methodology allows introducing demand feedback effects
into transport TIMES-based models. The resulting tool integrates three key determinants
of the assessment of policy effects in transport systems: consumer choice, congestion
feedback effects and constraints in the supply of energy. The tool therefore extends ongoing
efforts to introduce consumer behavior in transport TIMES-based models. At the same
time, by integrating consumption feedback effects, it allows the typical TIMES-based
analysis to take account of policy effects on consumption (such as the rebound effect) or
on feedback externalities (such as congestion). To the best of our knowledge this is the first
time that such effects are analyzed in a TIMES-based model. Finally, it provides a new
framework to take account of energy constraints in transport economic models in which
energy prices are typically assumed to be fixed.
Through a numerical illustration we showed the applicability of the approach for policy
analysis. Results are in line with previous literature and show the potential of the model
for deeper assessments. This is mainly because it allows to identify in a detailed way the
different margins of consumer behavior through which each policy works.
This approach could serve as the basis for a more detailed representation of the
intricate relationship between energy and transport, despite some limitations. The most
important limitation is not include a specific treatment of public transport. A more extensive
analysis would include optimization of frequencies (Mohring effect) and public transport
fares instead of relying on marginal production costs. Another limitation is not consider
conventional pollution externalities and this is important when analyzing environmental
policy instruments and local effects.
The model can be refined in several ways. Freight transport can be included through a
production function. Heterogeneous consumers can be introduced with different prefer-
ences over technologies and locations. The analysis of congestion pricing can be improved
by a rough differentiation of technologies so that toll exemptions for cleaner cars can be
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analyzed. This can be easily done by splitting the branch for cars, in the modal specifica-
tion, into clean and dirty technologies. An interesting extension would be linking speeds
in the demand side to fuel consumption in the supply side. This allows to analyze how the
relief of congestion can affect energy consumption and CO2 emissions or pollution.
Appendix 4.A Data and calibration
Demand side
For calibration, the demand model requires quantities and prices for each transport service,
and the elasticities of substitution between the branches of the demand tree. Quantities
demanded and resource costs29 come from the supply model (see next section), so that the
models share the same data for the base case. The elasticities of substitution between the
modes are defined such that the resulting own-price elasticities (Table 4.5) correspond to
typical values of own-price elasticities in the literature (see Litman 2013, Mayeres 2000,
Small and Winston 1999).
Table 4.5 Own-price elasticity of the demand base year
Mode Commuting Leisure
Metrop. Suburban S.Distance Metrop. Suburban S.Distance L.Distance
Peak
Car -0.268 -0.181 -0.182 -0.416 -0.470 -0.463 -0.444
Bus -0.295 -0.457 -0.103 -0.313 -0.113 -0.419
Metro -0.258 -0.269 -0.323 -0.199
Train -0.361 -0.279 -0.147 -0.360 -0.176 -0.223 -0.155
HST -0.152 -0.677
Plane -0.694
Off-peak
Car -0.508 -0.263 -0.210 -0.455 -0.376 -0.386 -0.389
Bus -0.348 -0.638 -0.101 -0.331 -0.432 -0.445
Metro -0.450 -0.383 -0.352 -0.285
Train -0.568 -0.360 -0.196 -0.435 -0.281 -0.537 -0.578
HST -0.151 -0.668
Plane -0.686
Time cost functions require, apart from the demand, average speeds and monetary
valuations of time. Average speeds for the base year are in line with the National Survey
29Only resource costs are required given that time costs are endogeneous to the model.
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on Transport and Travel 2007-2008 (CGDD, 2010). However, given that our model is
an aggregate of country transport activities, these speeds only reflect average conditions
for different infrastructures and regions and cannot be taken as describing one specific
case. As future speeds depend on infrastructure capacity, projections were made following
the main government investment projects from DGITM (2011) which gives priority to
investments in public transport instead of road infrastructure. This is reflected into the
model as a slight improvement (decline) in average speeds of rail (road) modes. Monetary
values of travel time savings (VTTS) for the base year are taken from Roquigny (2013).
They are increasing over time to be consistent with the fact that the willingness to pay to
save time has increased over time (see Hensher, 2011). Wardman (1998, 2001) suggests,
for instance, an elasticity of VTTS with respect to income between 0.5 and 0.72, we use
therefore an average increase of half of the GDP growth (0.7% per year).
Table 4.6 Value of time base year [e/h]
Mode Commuting Leisure
Urban S.Distance Urban S.Distance L.Distance
Car 10.0 11.5 6.8 7.7 12.4
Bus 6.9 7.8 4.6 5.2 8.4
Metro/Train 10.4 11.8 7.0 7.9 7.9
HST 17.8 11.9 11.9
Plane 20.4 20.4
Supply side
GDP growth is based on the projections of the DGTPE (1.4% and 2% for the periods
2010-2020 and 2020-2030) and on OECD long-term projections (1.4% for the period
2030-2050). The population scenario is based on the central scenario of the National
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) until 2040 and then prolonged at
the same average annual rate of the last ten years of this scenario (2030-2040). The main
sources for numerical assumptions, technology parameters and costs can be found in
Nicolas et al. (2014) (see their Figure 12, p.14). Based on these assumptions, the model is
calibrated (historical stocks of equipments, energy flows) to reproduce the 2007 situation.
Further details in Nicolas et al. (2014).
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